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Abstract 
 
 
Does the role played by venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies? How do they 
add value? What are the characteristics of those venture capitalists? Does financial leverage 
matter for VC-backed companies? All of these questions are researched in this dissertation. The 
manuscript specifically explores two cases. The first is the role of U.S. venture capitalists after 
the IPO of their troubled portfolio companies, while the second examines the role of venture 
capitalists in international investments. The findings detailed in the first part of the study show 
that a higher level of monitoring and involvement is a significant factor in being a successful 
company, but characteristics such as the age and reputation of VCs are not. Moreover, and as 
expected, financial leverage is shown to be an insignificant factor for a troubled VC-backed 
company. However, those characteristics of venture capitalists are useful in extending the life a 
VC-backed bankrupt portfolio company. The second part of the study reveals that U.S. venture 
capitalists prefer to cooperate with a foreign counterpart in order to delegate monitoring 
responsibilities. Also, international investments tend to have many more foreign venture 
capitalists and fewer non-managing board members than domestic investments. This manuscript 
is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the venture capital industry. Chapter 
2 discusses the problems of the VentureXpert database, its limitations and remedies. Chapter 3 
investigates the role of venture capitalists in troubled portfolio companies following an IPO. 
Chapter 4 looks into the role of U.S. venture capitalists in their international portfolio companies. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of the investigations and research. 
   
 
 1
Chapter 1: Overview of the Venture Capital Industry 
 
 
 “The question of what venture capitalists do has received surprising little academic scrutiny.”   
Thomas Hellmann and Manju Puri (2002) 
 
The first modern venture capital firm was established in 1946 by Karl Compton, the 
president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Merrill Griswold, the chairman of the 
Massachusetts Investors Trust, Ralph Flanders, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston and General Georges F. Doriot, a Harvard Business School professor. American 
Research and Development (ARD), the entity formed by these trend-setting men, financed 
commercial applications of technologies that were developed during the world-war period 
(Gompers, 2001; Lambe, 1992). Their investment was very successful and was referred to as a 
“home run” (Gompers, 2001). 
This success motivated the federal government to become involved in the activities of 
what became known as the venture capital industry. In 1958, the government established the 
Small Business Administration, which was given the authority to control new small business 
investment companies (SBICs) that provided financing and industry expertise (Gompers, 2001). 
By the 1980s, there was an increasing flow of funds into the venture capital industry from 
different types of investors, including individuals, pension funds, corporate funds and 
endowments. The flourishing of the venture capital industry during the 1980s was attributed 
mainly to the New Prudent Investor Rule that was enacted at the end of 1970s, which allowed 
institutional investors to invest in venture capital firms (VCFs).  
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Table 1 shows the growth of the number of venture capital funds for the period from 
1970 to 2004. In 1970, the total number of funds was only seven, but it crossed the 100 mark in 
1982. It reached its peak in 2000, when 1445 funds formed the venture capital industry. Since the 
burst of the bubble in April 2000, the number of funds decreased dramatically, with only 320 
funds in 2004. The table also shows the amounts raised annually by venture capitalists (VCs) 
from 1970 to 2004. In 1970, venture capitalists were able to raise $161.3 million dollars in 
commitments to fund portfolio companies. In 1979, the amount raised reached $1 billion. In the 
following years, it grew dramatically to reach its 200 peak of just over $158 billion. By 2004, 
however, the amount raised by VCs dropped to $29 billion. 
 
Table 1 
Amount Raised by Venture Capitalists and the Number of Funds (1970 to 2004) 
 
Year 
 
Amount Raised 
(Millions U.S.$) Number of Funds 
1970 161.3 7 
1971 103.8 11 
1972 496.9 14 
1973 99.0 11 
1974 380.4 12 
1975 89.2 9 
1976 301.7 14 
1977 210.4 11 
1978 361.4 20 
1979 1,031.8 21 
1980 2,265.8 61 
1981 1,659.8 89 
1982 1,948.0 100 
1983 4,207.9 161 
1984 4,112.4 152 
1985 4,738.0 162 
1986 4,706.7 134 
1987 5,412.8 143 
1988 6,278.4 140 
1989 6,745.3 158 
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Table 1 (Continued)  
   
Year 
 
Amount Raised 
(Millions U.S.$) Number of Funds 
1990 5,304.7 145 
1991 3,490.5 78 
1992 6,309.8 124 
1993 8,667.6 170 
1994 12,434.2 208 
1995 14,834.6 279 
1996 16,808.1 296 
1997 27,940.9 457 
1998 42,603.2 575 
1999 80,033.8 870 
2000 158,169.6 1,445 
2001 64,183.7 730 
2002 17,442.7 411 
2003 16,943.5 269 
2004 28,770.7 320 
 
Figures 1A and 1B outline commitments by participants in the venture capital industry. 
The difference between the two figures demonstrates the cyclical nature of this industry. In 
Figure 1A, the highest amount accounted for 38% of the total of commitments, and was funded 
by family or individual investors. The second highest percentage, 24%, was committed by 
corporate non-pension funds. Banks only accounted for 2% of the commitments. In Figure 1B, 
the highest percentages of commitments, 29% and 28%, represented foreign investors and 
pension funds respectively. Banks and other intermediaries’ commitments increased dramatically 
in 2004, compared to 1986, as they totaled 27% of the total commitments. An obvious difference 
between the two figures is the growth in the types of participants in the venture capital industry.   
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Figure 1A  
 
Commitments by Participants (1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1B  
 
Commitments by Participants (2004) 
 
 
Commitments by Participants (1986)
Family or 
Individuals
38%
Foreign
15%
Other
21%
Banks
2%
Corporate Non-
Pension
24%
Commitments by VC Participants (2004)
Banks
9%
Foreign/Other
29%
Intermediaries
18%
Endowment/
Foundations
5%
Family or 
Individuals
6%
Pension Funds
28%
Corporate Non-
Pension
2%
Insurance 
Companies
3%
 5
Demonstrating that VCs often work globally, the next group of tables highlights 
international participation. Table 2 shows the trend of investments in international portfolio 
companies by United States-based VCs. In 1990, 24 U.S. firms were involved in the international 
VC industry, funding 33 VC funds. In 2000 the number of firms increased to 484 firms funding 
702 funds, while in 2004 the number of firms had been 227 firms funding 329 VC funds. This 
illustrates that the increasing trend of this industry has been not only domestic, but also 
international. 
 
Table 2 
Trend of Investments in International Portfolio Companies by U.S. VCs (1990 to 2004) 
  
 Number Number Number Number Sum of  
 of of of of Investments 
Year Rounds1 Companies Funds Firms U.S.$ Millions 
1990 98 81 33 24 242.79 
1991 56 51 36 27 440.51 
1992 82 67 46 35 423.18 
1993 96 79 53 41 780.27 
1994 109 97 53 40 376.47 
1995 145 126 77 57 501.55 
1996 311 282 112 80 1,157.31 
1997 320 289 137 100 1,102.29 
1998 483 428 207 148 2,802.05 
1999 795 704 363 258 7,612.84 
2000 2,255 2,003 702 484 16,577.10 
2001 1,628 1,478 518 357 12,231.28 
2002 1,030 942 310 212 7,094.25 
2003 932 848 305 221 5,752.35 
2004 696 636 329 227 4,705.66 
TOTAL 9,037 8,112 3,282 2,312 61,799.92 
 
                                                 
1 Venture capitalists do not pay their commitments in a lump sum; they divide the total amount of commitments into 
different portions, which are called rounds. These rounds are paid to the portfolio company based on a preset 
schedule. This is one way in which venture capitalists control and monitor the activities of a portfolio company. 
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Table 3 shows the countries in which U.S.-based VCs have preferred to place their 
investments. Not surprisingly, countries with well-established economies, such as Canada, 
France, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, attract U.S. VCs.      
 
Table 3 
International Investments by U.S. Venture Capital Firms (1990 to 2004)  
 
  Number Percent Sum of  Percent 
 of of Total Investments of 
     Nation                      Companies Companies U.S.$ Millions Investments 
Algeria                          1 .02 4.05 .01 
Argentina                      38 .76 817.21 1.32 
Austria                          21 .42 156.77 .25 
Australia                       235 4.73 1753.07 2.84 
Bosnia/Herzegovina     1 .02 .65 .00 
Bermuda                       24 .48 3114.07 5.04 
Belgium                        79 1.59 1068.59 1.73 
Brazil                            46 .93 1510.78 2.44 
Bulgaria                        1 .02 9.50 .02 
British Virgin Islands   3 .06 29.11 .05 
Canada                          482 9.70 5535.26 8.96 
Czech Republic            19 .38 244.99 .40 
Chile                             12 .24 131.49 .21 
China                            146 2.94 3171.71 5.13 
Cayman Islands            7 .14 525.78 .85 
Cameroon                     1 .02 .18 .00 
Colombia                      6 .12 153.23 .25 
Costa Rica                    2 .04 3.50 .01 
Croatia                          2 .04 12.90 .02 
Cyprus                          2 .04 99.80 .16 
Denmark                       47 .95 678.66 1.10 
Estonia                          4 .08 54.90 .09 
Ecuador                        1 .02 27.80 .04 
El Salvador                   1 .02 1.00 .00 
French Guiana              1 .02 7.00 .01 
Finland                         72 1.45 207.51 .34 
France                           495 9.96 4367.68 7.07 
Germany                       283 5.69 2926.59 4.74 
Greece                          2 .04 .76 .00 
Hong Kong                   75 1.51 1656.99 2.68 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
     
  Number Percent Sum of  Percent 
 of of Total Investments of 
     Nation                      Companies Companies U.S.$ Millions Investments 
Hungary                        14 .28 143.94 .23 
Iceland                          2 .04 54.74 .09 
Indonesia                      19 .38 299.84 .49 
India                             169 3.40 2284.75 3.70 
Ireland                          104 2.09 1404.76 2.27 
Israel                             265 5.33 1877.19 3.04 
Italy                              75 1.51 976.34 1.58 
Jamaica                         1 .02 7.50 .01 
Jordan                           1 .02 3.00 .00 
Japan                             251 5.05 3644.27 5.90 
Kenya                           1 .02 1.00 .00 
Kazakhstan                   2 .04 9.23 .01 
Lithuania                      1 .02 4.60 .01 
Luxembourg                 13 .26 1215.51 1.97 
Malaysia                       23 .46 135.65 .22 
Moldova                       1 .02 2.50 .00 
Morocco                       3 .06 13.00 .02 
Mexico                         23 .46 349.45 .57 
Netherlands Antilles     1 .02 3.20 .01 
Nigeria                          2 .04 23.44 .04 
Norway                         30 .60 239.03 .39 
Netherlands                  101 2.03 1701.72 2.75 
New Zealand                14 .28 33.34 .05 
Peru                              1 .02 10.30 .02 
Philippines                    19 .38 171.22 .28 
Pakistan                        2 .04 .23 .00 
Poland                           37 .74 243.55 .39 
Portugal                        5 .10 57.96 .09 
Romania                       10 .20 120.62 .20 
Russia                           20 .40 78.86 .13 
South Africa                 12 .24 51.01 .08 
Singapore                     86 1.73 715.55 1.16 
South Korea                  301 6.06 3709.86 6.00 
Spain                             78 1.57 604.81 .98 
Slovakia                        3 .06 13.14 .02 
Sweden                         139 2.80 1090.05 1.76 
Switzerland                   69 1.39 848.74 1.37 
Thailand                       25 .50 180.36 .29 
Turkey                          3 .06 27.12 .04 
Tunisia                          1 .02 9.80 .02 
Taiwan                          76 1.53 573.61 .93 
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Table 3 (Continued)     
     
  Number Percent Sum of  Percent 
 of of Total Investments of 
     Nation                      Companies Companies U.S.$ Millions Investments 
United Arab Emirates   1 .02 20.00 .03 
Uganda                         1 .02 .79 .00 
United Kingdom           853 17.16 10426.02 16.87 
Venezuela                     2 .04 143.60 .23 
Vietnam                        1 .02 3.00 .00 
Zambia                         1 .02 .16 .00 
TOTAL                            61799.92   
 
The cyclical nature and performance of the venture capital industry have attracted both 
academics and practitioners to analyze the workings of this industry. Lerner (2002) investigated 
the recent drop in the venture capital industry and pointed out that this decrease may not be as 
grim as it appears because of the significant impact of the industry on innovation. On average, 
the performance of a venture-backed company differs from that of a non-VC-backed company; 
Brav and Gompers (1997) discovered that venture-backed companies outperform non-VC-
backed companies.  
Moreover, the industry has many unique characteristics in relation to other financial 
intermediaries. Although the venture capital industry provides funding, as banks do, it provides 
equity rather than debt. In addition to funding, venture capitalists also provide industry expertise 
and networking with other professionals, such as lawyers and accountants. Previous literature has 
pointed out other characteristics that are unique to this industry, such as staging,2 grandstanding,3 
the heavy use of convertibles in investments and participation on the board of directors 
(Sahlman, 1990).  
                                                 
2 Staging refers to paying commitments to the portfolio companies in stages as milestones are achieved.  
3 An IPO timing decision made by an inexperienced VC is different than one made by a veteran. Companies that are 
backed by inexperienced VCs experience more under-pricing than companies backed by experienced VCs 
(Gompers, 1996). 
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Although academics have been active in exploring the venture capital industry, not all of 
the questions they raise have been answered. For example, Lerner (1995) suggested several 
venues of research, one of which is to investigate the impact of venture capitalists’ involvement 
in firms after they go public. Another topic suggested by Lerner (1995) was the study of the 
importance of geographic proximity. Several researchers have attempted to conduct this study 
within the U.S.; however, the matter is so broad that several aspects of the topic have been 
overlooked. A more recent paper by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) highlighted the need for future 
research, which would aim to better understand the organizational structure of the VC industry. 
The motivation of this manuscript is to fill the gaps left by previous research.  
 
 
 10
Chapter 2: Data Problems and Remedies 
 
 
 Finding information about private equity-backed firms and private equity organizations is often 
difficult. If the firm is privately held, it is likely to attract little outside scrutiny and to disclose 
scant public information. Even if the firm is publicly traded, its coverage by the press may be 
infrequent. These problems are even more severe for private equity organizations. Private equity 
organizations tend to be extremely reluctant to disclose information about their successes, much 
less their failures.”  
Josh Lerner (2004) 
 
Several data problems are inherent in venture capital industry research. This chapter 
discusses these problems, the potential limitations caused by these issues and proposed remedies. 
The data sources for this dissertation are the VentureXpert (VE) database (part of the Securities 
Data Corporation [SDC]), CRSP and COMPUSTAT tapes.  
One problem with the VE database is that it depends on the voluntary reporting of funds 
by private equity firms (general partners) and the limited partners in these firms (Kaplan and 
Schoar, 2005). Also, Kaplan et al. indicated that a possible bias could occur in the form of 
underreporting worse performing funds.  
 The proposed remedy to this problem is to cross-check the companies that filed for an 
IPO in the VE database with SDC’s Global New Issues database, which reports all companies 
that filed for an IPO. The use of this combination of databases delivers a reasonably complete list 
of firms that filed for an IPO. The second step of the remedy is to ensure that the numbers of 
defunct companies (according to the VE database) are correct. After acquiring the names and 
CUSIP numbers of the companies that filed for an IPO via the VE database, the VC-backed 
companies that filed for an IPO were matched with the CRSP (Center for Research in Security 
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Prices) database. The name of the company, the PERMNO, and the date of delisting4 were 
identified. If the reason for delisting is bankruptcy or liquidation, then that company was 
included in the chosen sample.  
Table 4 was compiled directly from the VE database, without involving the CRSP cross-
check. The table shows the total number of companies per year (from 1970 to 2004) that filed for 
an IPO; these are then divided into the status of these portfolio companies. The analysis shows 
how many companies are still public, have gone private, have merged with another company as a 
subsidiary, are defunct or do not fall into these classifications.5 
 The table illustrates that 3,316 VC-backed companies went public during the specified 
period. Approximately 70% of those companies are still public, while 21% of the companies 
have merged with other companies as subsidiaries. There were 132 defunct companies for the 
period from 1970 to 2004, and seemingly only 36 for the period from 1990 to 2004. However, by 
adopting the above-mentioned steps, the number of defunct companies during the same period in 
the original sample became 180 portfolio companies.  
The delisting bias6 in the CRSP database described by Shumway (1997) and then by 
Shumway and Warther (1999) does not affect the results of this study, because the delisting bias 
concerns missing returns of delisted firms after the actual delisting. However, this study 
concentrates on the time before and up to delisting.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Delisting occurs for many reasons, such as mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation or migration to another 
exchange (Shumway and Warther, 1999). 
5 The category of “Other” comprises companies that registered for an IPO but did not actually go public. 
6 Shumway and Warther (1999) stated that the delisting bias occurs when “…many returns in CRSP’s database are 
missing for firms that are delisted from NASDAQ for performance reasons…” 
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Table 4 
 
VC-backed U.S. Portfolio Companies that Filed for an IPO (1970-2004)  
 
Year Total Public Private Subsidiary Defunct Other 
1970 19 11 1 7 0 0 
1971 27 10 5 10 2 0 
1972 70 34 7 28 1 0 
1973 17 6 3 7 0 1 
1974 4 1 1 1 1 0 
1975 2 1 0 1 0 0 
1976 14 2 1 11 0 0 
1977 6 2 0 3 1 0 
1978 17 11 0 6 0 0 
1979 34 21 2 11 0 0 
1980 56 32 2 21 1 0 
1981 93 53 4 34 2 0 
1982 37 19 0 16 2 0 
1983 186 103 8 73 2 0 
1984 79 46 1 28 4 0 
1985 68 38 6 23 0 1 
1986 348 165 21 88 74 0 
1987 124 72 5 44 3 0 
1988 53 32 1 19 1 0 
1989 62 45 0 15 2 0 
1990 65 47 0 16 2 0 
1991 141 95 5 39 1 1 
1992 176 121 4 46 5 0 
1993 185 138 7 39 0 1 
1994 132 96 3 29 3 1 
1995 178 131 9 36 1 1 
1996 241 214 11 12 4 0 
1997 128 108 7 8 4 1 
1998 78 72 3 2 1 0 
1999 264 225 7 23 9 0 
2000 242 208 4 23 6 1 
2001 37 35 0 2 0 0 
2002 23 23 0 0 0 0 
2003 27 27 0 0 0 0 
2004 83 83 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 3316 2327 128 721 132 8 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Venture Capitalists in Bankruptcy 
 
 
This chapter covers a timely topic: the role of venture capitalists in their portfolio 
companies. More specifically, the paper investigates the effect of monitoring techniques and the 
characteristics of venture capitalists in bankrupt venture capital-backed public companies. First, 
this essay fills the gap in existing academic literature that investigates the relationship between 
venture capitalists and their portfolio companies after an IPO. Second, since the venture capital 
industry is unique, the determinants of bankruptcy are expected to be different from those 
brought to light in previous literature. Finally, the paper studies the role of venture capitalists’ 
monitoring techniques to determine the success of such companies after an IPO. The results of 
this study are important for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs because they reveal the 
interaction between the two parties in a late stage of their relationship. 
 14
 
 
“By intensively scrutinizing firms before providing capital and then monitoring them afterwards, 
venture capital organizations can alleviate some of the information gaps and reduce 
constraints.”  
 Josh Lerner (2002) 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter investigates the role of venture capitalists when a venture-backed company 
that has already gone public is failing. The main questions that this study raises are divided into 
two categories. One section of the research examines the different characteristics of venture 
capitalists (VCs) in the case of bankruptcy; questions addressed include whether less experienced 
VCs have the same effect on their portfolio companies as seasoned VCs and how the current 
holdings of portfolio companies affect VCs’ decisions about whether to rush toward liquidation7 
and move on to a new portfolio company or to attempt a turn-around. The second section focuses 
on the ability to estimate the probability that a public venture-backed company will go bankrupt. 
This chapter investigates the determinants in this situation and whether they are the same as have 
been described by the previous literature in the case of manufacturing non-VC-backed 
companies.  
There are two points that support the motivation for this research. First, venture 
capitalists are required to hold a specific percentage of their companies after the initial public 
offering. VCs cannot sell their ownership at the point of an IPO due to the lock-up period 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Hence, it is in the interest of VCs to monitor the company and its 
market price for a fair amount of time after the IPO. Previous literature does not reveal how VCs 
                                                 
7 Throughout this manuscript, liquidation can also be referred to as reorganization, bankruptcy or declaration as 
defunct.  
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behind failed companies behave after the lock-up period. Second, earlier research has 
investigated the determinants of success for venture-backed companies, and this research has 
been conducted at the time of an IPO. The situation is expected to be different after the IPO.  
In addition, previous literature investigated the determinants of bankruptcy for non-
venture-backed, mostly non-high-tech firms . Assuming that the “one-size–fits-all” approach 
does not hold, the key determinants of bankruptcy for the sample collected should be different 
from for the sample(s) investigated previously in other studies. 
The implications of this study are important for academics and practitioners. The paper 
investigates areas that have not been addressed in previous academic literature. The study takes 
advantage of the reasonable enhancements in the VentureXpert (VE) database. Practitioners will 
be interested in such a topic, since it reveals the techniques that are normally used in the industry 
in a situation that all venture capitalists try to avoid. This will help VCs, especially inexperienced 
ones, in making better decisions in such a rough time. 
Venture Capital Literature 
Previous literature shows that venture capitalists have consistently been able to take 
advantage of the status of the IPO market. Ritter (1991) showed that IPO underperformance 
changes from one year to another. There are “hot” IPO periods, “windows of opportunity” when 
it is easier for investors, such as VCs, to carry out an IPO. Therefore, a successful IPO may be 
due to the characteristics of the market at the time of the offering as well as the features of the 
company.  
Reputation is a very important asset for VCs, and acquiring a good one is a goal for every 
VC. These concerns about reputation effect the behavior of VCs. Gompers (1996) demonstrated 
that the IPO timing decision made by an inexperienced VC differs from one made by a veteran 
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VC. This “grandstanding” hypothesis explains that companies backed by less seasoned VC firms 
are younger and more under-priced compared to those backed by experienced VC firms. This 
happens because young VCs try to signal their reputation to the market. By creating a good 
reputation, they are able to increase the size of their funds and consequently generate more 
business.  
The literature highlights another difference in the behavior between young and seasoned 
VCs. Lerner (1994) showed that seasoned VCs are proficient at taking companies public when 
markets are at their peaks. Lerner attributed this to the possibility that less experienced VCs were 
not able to command the attention of investment bankers when markets were at their pinnacles, 
whereas seasoned VCs could. Consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis, Neus and Walz 
(2005) found that young VCs might use under-pricing as a device for credibly committing 
themselves to establishing their reputation. 
The ability of VCs to turn around a defunct company will have an impact on the future of 
venture capital in general. Cumming, Fleming and Suchard (2005) show that there will be 
significantly more capital allocated to VCs providing financial and strategic/management 
expertise to entrepreneurial firms. Cumming et al. (2005) highlight that fundraising is higher 
among funds with higher returns and performance fees and lower fixed management fees. 
Unsurprisingly, VCs need to increase returns and cut costs. If a company is failing and is facing 
possible bankruptcy, then conflict will arise. On the one hand, if the VC decided to liquidate, that 
would effect the performance (rate of return) of the fund. On the other hand, if the VC decided 
not to liquidate, then the VC will have to bear more risk by investing more and waiting for a 
future, uncertain harvest. This investment will increase costs and thus management fees.  
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Bankruptcy Literature  
The literature on bankruptcy has cited the predictability of bankrupt companies, and the 
evidence in the literature differentiated between the attributes and behavior of the venture capital 
industry and other industries. Thus, it is expected that models that have been used previously to 
predict bankruptcy may not work for the venture capital industry. Moreover, Altman (1993) 
points out that the predictability of bankruptcy for a specific industry, which is dependent on a 
general bankruptcy model, is debatable. He reasoned that if one is interested in a particular 
industry grouping, then data from healthy and failing companies in that industry should be 
collected.  
Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002) cited the results of a recent Dun & Bradstreet compilation 
that ranked the causes of business failure. The two main reasons were financial factors (including 
high debt usage and insufficient capital) and economic factors. These financial factors may not 
be the main causes of business failure in the venture capital industry, due to the significant role 
played by VCs throughout the life of their investments.  
 Recent studies such the one conducted by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) 
revisited the determinants of corporate failures and the pricing of financially distressed firms. 
They found that firms with higher leverage, lower profitability, higher market-book ratios, lower 
market capitalization, more volatile stock returns and lower cash holdings are more likely to file 
for bankruptcy or to be delisted. In addition, they found that on a longer horizon market 
capitalization, market-book ratio and equity volatility are more persistent. 
 The literature about bankruptcy is very broad. For example, Altman (1968) tried to assess 
the analytical quality of ratio analysis. He revealed that a discriminant ratio model is an 
extremely accurate one in predicting bankruptcy. However, the study suffered from a sample 
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bias.8 Mossman, Bell, Swartz and Turtle (1998) show that there are four main types of 
bankruptcy prediction models, and each of them is based on financial statement ratios, cash 
flows, stock returns and return standard deviations respectively. Their results indicate that no 
existing model adequately captures bankruptcy data. However, the cash flow model works best 
during the two to three years before bankruptcy, while the ratio model is best applied to the year 
immediately before bankruptcy.  
Another venue of previous bankruptcy literature is the behavior of insiders in the case of 
bankruptcy or reorganization. Loderer and Sheehan (1989) and Gosnell, Keown and Pinkerton 
(1992) present empirical evidence that corporate managers do not sell their holdings prior to 
filing for bankruptcy. On the other hand, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) document that corporate 
insiders do engage in significant sales of their holdings in the months and years preceding 
bankruptcy filings. 
 This inconsistency in the previous literature affects this study in terms of how VCs 
behave in relation to bankruptcy. Although this study will not document the trading of VCs 
before filing for bankruptcy, it tries to determine if they want to “bail out” quickly to be able to 
invest in another portfolio company or if they stick around, hoping for a future turnaround.  
Hypotheses and Methodology 
This section explains the testing of several hypotheses regarding the behavior of venture 
capitalists during the bankruptcy stage of VC-backed companies, as well as the predictability of 
bankruptcy among such firms. Despite the fact that the determinants of bankruptcy have been 
investigated in the previous literature, such determinants focused generally on firms with high 
levels of fixed assets and debt. This study anticipates that the determinants will be different in 
this research, since the sample firms were backed by venture capitalists (source of a solid source 
                                                 
8 The sample consisted only of publicly held manufacturing corporations.  
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of finance) and since they are mainly high-tech companies that depend more on intangible assets 
rather than on fixed assets.  
The following hypotheses practically test the questions raised earlier in this study. 
Hypothesis 1: A venture capitalists’ decision to file for corporate reorganization or bankruptcy is 
a function of the percentage of commitment. Practically, higher fund commitment percentage 
levels compared to their average investment result in a lower tendency for VCs to liquidate the 
portfolio company. If the VC has already invested a lot of his/her funds in that firm and has spent 
a lot of time monitoring and helping to manage that firm, then the VC will be reluctant to simply 
write off that investment. 
H10: The VC’s fund commitment/investment percentage level (PER) is 
unrelated to a tendency toward bankruptcy. 
H1A: The higher the VC’s fund commitment/investment percentage (PER) 
level, the higher the tendency for success (SUCCESS). 
 
 The variable (PER) is defined as the amount invested by the VC in a specific company 
compared to the average investment amount of that VC per company. If the percentage (PER) is 
more than 100%, then the VC is investing more than usual in that company. Similarly, if the 
percentage (PER) is equal to 100%, then the VC has invested an amount comparable to his/her 
average investment. This means that if a VC invests a high proportion in the portfolio company, 
then he/she will do everything possible to avoid bankruptcy. This includes using the available 
professional network and devoting more time to solving the portfolio company’s problems. On 
the other hand, if a VC is investing a small portion of his/her fund in a non-performing portfolio 
company, then he/she will not be as keen to turn it around; therefore,the model expects that the 
PER will be positively related to success.  
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 Applying the same concept to the sub-sample of bankrupt firms, a VC will try to list the 
portfolio companies in his/her portfolio for the longest time period possible in order to avoid 
filing for bankruptcy. This is expected to be more pronounced when the VC invests a higher 
proportion of his/her funds in a specific company. 
  
H1S0: The VC’s fund commitment/investment percentage level (PER) is 
unrelated to the duration of the life of a bankrupt company. 
H1SA: The higher the VC’s fund commitment/investment percentage level 
(PER), the higher the duration (DURATION) of the life of a bankrupt 
company. 
 
The variable PER is expected to be positive in comparison to the duration of the life of a 
bankrupt company. In other words, it is expected that the higher the investment percentage, the 
longer the life of a bankrupt company.   
Hypothesis 2: Reputation is a very important asset for VCs. A venture capitalist’s 
decision to liquidate is a function of the recent history of that venture capitalist. The higher the 
number of recent successes (RECENT), the lower the tendency for success (SUCCESS). If the 
VC has experienced a recent reputation for placing companies successfully into IPOs (ignoring 
the age of the venture capital firm), then the bankruptcy will not affect that recent reputation. 
Therefore, the VC will decide to liquidate the company. 
H20: The number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC to limited 
partners and potential financiers is unrelated to a tendency toward liquidation. 
H2A: The higher the number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC 
to limited partners and potential financiers, the lower the tendency for success 
(SUCCESS). 
  
 RECENT is the proxy that is used to measure the recent successes of a VC. The number 
of successes is measured by the number of IPOs in which the VC participated in the last two 
years. If a VC has a high number of recent successes, he/she will not be keen to turn around the 
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company, compared to a VC that experiences a higher failure rate. The VC with a lower rate of 
success will devote more time and money to turning around the portfolio company. Hence, the 
probability to expedite liquidation is higher when the VC has a high number of recent successes. 
 A concern about the above hypothesis (H2A) is that it may not hold if the proxy 
(RECENT) is a proxy for reputation instead of a proxy for recent success.9 Hence, the second 
hypothesis could be reworded as: 
H20: The  number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC to limited 
partners and potential financiers is unrelated to a tendency toward liquidation. 
H2A: The higher the number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC 
to limited partners and potential financiers, the better the reputation gained by 
the VC and the higher the tendency for success (SUCCESS). 
 
Following the above theme, the same motivation affects the behavior of a VC in 
extending the life of a portfolio company because the VC expects to avoid liquidation (in the 
case of a lack of recent successes). This intuition is supported by the fact that the VC needs more 
time in his/her attempt to turn around a portfolio company. 
H2S0: The number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC to limited 
partners and potential financiers is unrelated to the duration (DURATION) of 
a bankrupt company’s life. 
H2SA: The higher the number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a 
VC to limited partners and potential financiers, the shorter the duration 
(DURATION) of its VC-backed bankrupt company’s life. 
 
 RECENT is expected to be negative and significant, so the higher the number of 
successes accomplished by the VC during the previous two years, the shorter the duration 
(DURATION) of the life of a bankrupt company. The VC will spend more time, money and 
effort if he/she has not attained a strong reputation in the market. Moreover, this VC will be 
reluctant to admit failure, since that will hurt his/her reputation.  
                                                 
9 I thank Professor Sudha Krishnaswami and the participants in the doctoral workshop at the University of New 
Orleans for this suggestion.  
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 Again, with RECENT as a proxy for reputation, then the hypothesis would be: 
H2S0: The number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a VC to limited 
partners and potential financiers is unrelated to the duration (DURATION) of 
a bankrupt company’s life. 
H2SA: The higher the number of recent successes (RECENT) reported by a 
VC to limited partners and potential financiers, the better the reputation 
gained by the VC and the longer the duration (DURATION) of its VC-backed 
bankrupt company’s life. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The more seasoned the venture capital firm (identified by its age [AGE]  
and ignoring historical success rates), the lower the tendency toward bankruptcy. If the VC is 
experienced and has established his/her reputation with a long, successful history, then the 
turnaround will be easier for him/her than for an inexperienced VC.  
 
H30: A more seasoned VC (AGE) will not be able to turn around a failing 
company. 
H3A: The more seasoned the VC(AGE), the lower the tendency toward 
bankruptcy for the distressed VC-backed company and the greater the 
tendency for success (SUCCESS). 
 
 The AGE of the VC will be used to measure the experience of the VC, and hence his/her 
reputation. If a VC can survive for ten years, he/she will have a better reputation than a VC that 
has been in business for two years. More experience gives the advantage of more knowledge, 
and a better reputation ensures a better external network. The model expects AGE to be 
positively related to the success of a portfolio company. 
The general objective of a VC is to maximize gains and minimize losses. It is expected 
that a seasoned VC will have the experience to better execute this objective than an 
inexperienced one. Thus, an experienced VC can affect the duration of the life of a bankrupt 
company with expertise in finance, networking and strategy. A younger VC would like to do the 
same, but will have limited experience that precludes him/her from doing so. 
 23
H3S0: A more seasoned VC (AGE) will not be able to affect the duration of 
the life of a bankrupt company. 
H3SA: The more seasoned the VC (AGE), the longer the duration 
(DURATION) of the life of a bankrupt company. 
 
 AGE is expected to be positive and significant, so the higher the age of a VC in years, the 
longer the life of the bankrupt company. An inexperienced VC will not be able to finance a 
bankrupt portfolio company to the same extent as the seasoned one. One of the limitations of a 
young VC is the (un)availability of financing, which is affected by the ability to raise more 
funds. Another reason is limited strategic experience and underdeveloped professional networks. 
Hypothesis 4: Although financial leverage in general is a major factor in bankruptcy, it is 
expected not to be significant for venture-backed companies, since they depend on VCs to fund 
their operations through equity or preferred securities. 
H40: Financial leverage (DE) is significantly related to bankrupt VC-backed 
companies. 
H4A: Financial leverage (DE) is insignificantly related to the success 
(SUCCESS) of VC-backed companies.  
 
To measure the effect of financial leverage, this study uses the ratio of debt to equity 
(DE). High financial leverage has always been a significant factor in predicting bankruptcy. It is 
assumed that the capital structure of VC-backed companies will be different from non-VC-
backed companies. Hence, it is expected that debt-to-equity ratio will have no significant effect 
on predicting bankruptcy for VC-backed companies. 
Since long-term debt is irrelevant for VC-backed companies, it is also expected to be 
irrelevant for the sub-sample of bankrupt companies. As discussed earlier, VC-backed portfolio 
companies are expected to carry a lower debt amount than non-VC-backed companies. 
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Therefore, it is expected that the debt-to-equity ratio (DE) will be insignificant in affecting the 
duration of the life of a VC-backed bankrupt company.  
H4S0: Financial leverage is a major factor in the duration of the life 
(DURATION) of a bankrupt VC-backed company. 
H4SA: Financial leverage (DE) is not a major factor in the duration of the life 
(DURATION) of a bankrupt VC-backed company. 
 
Hypothesis 5: One of the monitoring techniques of VCs is the staging of financing 
proxied by the number of rounds (RND). This technique calls for VCs to provide financing based 
on the progress of the company; with each step the company completes, the management of the 
company is required to send a report summarizing the results of such a milestone. Then, the VCs 
will consider the amount that should be provided to the portfolio company. The hypothesis 
expects that the closer the monitoring and involvement of VCs (thus a higher number of funding 
rounds), the higher the probability of success due to the additional professional and strategic 
expertise that the VC contributes to the portfolio company.  
H50: The number of rounds (“closer monitoring”) (RNDS) is unrelated to the 
success (SUCCESS) of a portfolio company. 
H5A: The higher the number of rounds (RNDS), the higher the probability of 
success (SUCCESS). 
  
 RNDS is a proxy for the degree of VC monitoring of portfolio companies. It is expected 
that the higher the level of involvement of VCs in their investments, the better the results of their 
portfolio companies. Therefore, this variable is positive and significant.  
 In the case of the sub-sample of bankrupt companies, the picture is expected to be 
different. The degree of monitoring is not expected to affect the duration (DURATION) of the 
life of bankrupt companies. Close monitoring is expected to be effective during the early years of 
companies. Therefore, there should be a time lag between monitoring and outcome. If companies 
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benefited from closer monitoring and still went bankrupt, then it is expected that the effect of this 
monitoring would be trivial in extending the life of those companies. 
H5S0: The higher the number of rounds (“closer monitoring”) (RNDS), the 
longer the duration (DURATION) of the life of a portfolio company. 
H5SA: The number of rounds (RNDS) is unrelated to the duration 
(DURATION) of the life of a portfolio company. 
  
 RNDS is expected to have an insignificant effect on the life of a bankrupt VC-backed 
company. In other words, the hypotheses suggest that monitoring is not effective during the latter 
stages of a VC-backed company’s life. 
These hypotheses can be tested by conducting a logistic model and an OLS that include 
all of the above determinants. Appendix I summarizes the models and relates them to the 
predictable hypotheses. The proposed models are as follows: 
LOGIT analysis 
The first set of the hypotheses posed (H1A, H2A, H3A, H4A, and H5A) concerning the 
likelihood of success or failure are tested by the following logistic model: 
εββββββββα +++++++++= ++−++ SALESINDMBDEAGERECENTRNDSPERSuccess Insig 87654
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Where: 
• SUCCESS is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the portfolio company did not file for 
bankruptcy, and “zero” otherwise. 
• PER is the percentage of the fund that is invested in the portfolio company. One of the 
problems of this ratio is that each portfolio company is funded by a variety of VC funds. 
Some companies are funded by 30 funds. In addition, this variable is new to venture 
capital literature. Several measurements were used as a proxy in order to achieve the 
most accurate result: (a) PCAV of fund j, equals total estimated amount of fund j’s 
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investment in company i divided by fund j’s average company investment. In order to get 
around the problem of consolidating the effect of many funds into one ratio, the mean and 
median were calculated. PCAVMN equals the mean of the ratio of PCAV that relates to 
company i, which had funds j through k. Similarly, PCAVMD equals the median of the 
ratio PCAV that relates to company i, which had funds j through k. (b) PCMX of fund j, 
equals total estimated amount of fund j’s investment in company i divided by funds j’s 
maximum company investment. PCMXMN equals the mean of the ratio of PCMX that 
relates to company i, which had funds j through k and, PCMXMD equals the median of 
the ratio PCMX that relates to company i, which had funds j through k. The expected sign 
for this variable is “+” for H1A. 
• RNDS is the average number of rounds that a venture capitalist invested in the portfolio 
company. The expected sign for this variable is “+” for H5A. 
• RECENT refers to the number of recent successes of the venture capital fund within the 
last two years (excluding the year of delisting). The number of recent successes is 
measured by the number of IPOs in which the VC firm took part. Again, many funds 
invest in one company, while RECENT is a ratio that is specific to each fund. To 
overcome this problem, the same technique is used here. RECMN is the mean of 
RECENT of funds j and k that invest in company i, and RECMD is the median of  
RECENT of funds j and k that invest in company i. The expected sign for this variable is 
“-/+” for H2A. 
• AGE refers to the average age of the venture capital firms that invest in company i. This 
is used as a proxy for the level of experience of a VC. AGE is calculated as the number of 
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years between the firm’s inception and the delisting year of the portfolio company. The 
expected sign for this variable is “+” for H3A. 
• DE is the portfolio company’s ratio of debt to equity. The expected sign for this variable 
is “insignificant” for H4A. 
• MB is the portfolio company’s ratio of market to book. 
• IND is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the company is high-tech and “zero” 
otherwise. 
•  SALES is the portfolio company’s sales. 
• ε  is the random error term. 
The LOGIT model measures the probability of SUCCESS of a public VC-backed 
company. The model proposes that the commitment of a VC’s proxied PER held by the fund in 
the portfolio company has a positive relation with success. Similarly, the experience of a VC’s 
proxied AGE has a positive relation with success. In addition, the model infers that financial 
leverage (DE) will not be a significant factor for bankruptcy. In addition, a high number of recent 
successes by the VC (RECENT) will be negatively related to the success of portfolio firms. On 
the other hand, if RECENT is a proxy for reputation, a positive relation is established with 
success, and, finally, it is expected that the closer the monitoring of a VC’s proxied RNDS, the 
higher the probability of success.  
OLS analysis 
The second set of the hypotheses posed (HS1A, HS2A, HS3A, HS4A, and HS5A) 
concerning the likelihood of success or failure is tested by the following OLS model: 
εβ
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Where: 
• DURATION is the number of years of the life of a bankrupt portfolio company. It is 
calculated as the year of delisting minus the year of IPO. 
• LNRNDS is the Ln of the RNDS variable. 
• LNRECENT is the Ln of the RECENT variable. LNRECMN and LNRECMD variables 
follow the same application. 
• LNAGE is the Ln of the AGE variable. 
• LNSALES is the Ln of the SALES variable. 
The regression model measures the effect of a VC’s monitoring techniques and of the 
characteristics of the VC and the company on the duration of the life of a bankrupt VC-backed 
company. Most of the arguments discussed above apply here. The model expects that the higher 
the commitment (PER) of the VC in a portfolio company, the longer its life. On the other hand, 
the number of recent successes (RECENT) is expected to have either a negative or a positive 
relation with the duration (DURATION) of the life of a bankrupt company. Moreover, the 
experience of a VC (proxied by AGE) should have a positive effect on the life of a bankrupt 
company. Finally, closer monitoring (RNDS) is expected to have an insignificant effect on 
extending the life of a bankrupt company. 
Data and Sample Selection 
The data collection is composed of a mix of variables collected from private databases, such as 
the SDC database, and hand-collected data from newswires, such as Lexus-Nexus. This study 
covers the period from 1990 to 2004. It has been stated that the data available from the SDC 
database in the 1970s and 1980s are not accurate. For example, data concerning the number of 
rounds were overstated. It has been found that spurious rounds are most frequent in older firms 
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and in earlier records (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Furthermore, working with data gathered 
after 1990 is reasonably justified as the total number of years for the sample will be 15.  
The data was collected from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New Issues 
Database, containing IPOs between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2004. To be included, the 
IPO must have occurred in the U.S. and the company must be a venture-backed company. The 
search retrieved 2,317 companies. Only those with an IPO flag were selected, so the number of 
companies dropped to 2,169. 
Second, it was necessary to collect the permanent numbers (PERMNO) for all of these 
companies, since the CRSP database and the matched CRSP/COMPUSTAT use the PERMNO. 
The CUSIP and ticker for each company was tabulated and entered into the CRSP database to 
get the PERMNO. In this process, five companies were eliminated because of a lack of a 
PERMNO. The final sample, up to this step, consists of 2,164 companies. The companies that 
were eliminated were researched in other databases such as Factiva, Mergent and Hoover’s 
Online to ensure that this elimination was not an error.  
Third, the PERMNO for each company was tabulated and entered into the CRSP 
delisting database. This step was important in identifying healthy companies from defunct ones. 
This database shows the current status of each company (traded vs. delisted), the date of delisting 
and the reason for delisting. The CRSP codes divide the delisting into several categories: code 
100: active, code 200: mergers, code 300: change of exchanges, code 400: liquidations, code 
500: dropped, code 600: expirations and code 900: domestic companies that became foreign. The 
research identified two main categories: the main sample of the study, consisting of companies 
that were bankrupt, liquidated or delisted because of insolvency, and the matching group, 
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consisting of active firms and companies that have been the subject of mergers.10 Merged 
companies were considered healthy because they were active when the matched bankrupt 
companies delisted, and they remained active and stand-alone firms for about six months after 
the date of delisting for matched bankrupt companies. 
The healthy companies’ group has codes of 100 (active and still traded up to 12/31/2004) 
and 200 to 290 (mergers). The defunct group contains all of the 400 codes (400, 401, 403, 450, 
460, 470, 480 and 490) that were assigned to liquidated companies. In addition, companies that 
had been dropped or delisted by the exchanges for reasons of insolvency were included in this 
group. All of the codes between 550 and 574 (550, 551, 552, 560, 561, 570, 572, 573 and 574) 
were selected. Examples include: company request, liquidation, insufficient capital and/or equity, 
bankruptcy or declared insolvent, insufficient float or assets and an insufficient number of 
shareholders. The total sample included 319 defunct companies and 1230 healthy companies. 
Fourth, the 319 companies were matched with a group of 319 healthy companies. The 
match was based on the year of the IPO, so the study measures the behavior of these companies 
during the same time period. In addition, they were matched according to industry (high-tech vs. 
non-high-tech). The third matching criterion is the two-digit SIC code, and may go to only one 
digit SIC code, and the final criterion is size of assets.  
Fifth, the above sample of 638 companies was entered into the merged 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT database to download variables specific to the portfolio companies such as 
sales, common equity and debt. 
Sixth, the SDC VentureXpert (VE) database (containing variables related to portfolio 
companies) was used to select the venture capital funds for the period 1/1/1990 to 12/31/2004. 
                                                 
10 Mergers are included to extend the matching group, so a more accurate matching sample is used. Of course, the 
merged company has a merger date AFTER the delisting date of the bankrupt company. 
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Again, the same conditions (the IPO occurred in the U.S. and the company was venture-backed) 
were satisfied. This step is important in downloading the variables that are related to the venture 
capitalists that supported these VC-backed public companies.  
Finally, the outcome of the fifth and sixth steps was merged to form the final sample, 
which consists of 380 companies divided into two groups: 180 defunct companies and 180 
healthy companies.   
Summary Statistics 
This section shows the summary statistics for portfolio companies that filed for an IPO 
and interprets the summary statistics of the selected sample. Table 5 shows the timeline of 
delisting, the number of companies delisted each year and the percentage of delisting for each 
year. It was expected that the year 2000 would have the highest percentage of delisting (defunct 
companies), since that was the year that the internet bubble burst; however, only 28 companies 
delisted during that year (7.37% of the total sample). The highest numbers of delisted companies 
occurred in 2001, 2002 and 2003. In 2001, 82 companies were delisted (defunct), which 
comprised 21.58% of the companies in the sample. In 2002 and 2003, a total of 28.42% of the 
companies in the sample were delisted. This trend shows that VC-backed companies did not die 
right at the time of the bursting of the bubble, but survived for a longer amount of time. The 
effect of VCs is investigated in the second part of the empirical results. 
Table 5, Panel B shows the duration in years of the life of bankrupt portfolio companies. 
The general trend of the duration is negatively sloped. The percentage of portfolio companies 
that lived longer is negatively proportional to the duration in years. A large portion of the 
companies in the sample survived between two and four years. 76, 78 and 48 companies 
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survived for two, three and four years respectively. The total percentage for these three years 
adds up to approximately 53% of the total sample.  
 
Table 5, Panel A  
 
Number of Portfolio Companies, Percentage of the Total Sample in Each Delisting Year 
 
Year of Delisting Number of Companies % 
1993 4 1.05% 
1994 6 1.58% 
1995 22 5.79% 
1996 6 1.58% 
1997 12 3.16% 
1998 34 8.95% 
1999 58 15.26% 
2000 28 7.37% 
2001 82 21.58% 
2002 70 18.42% 
2003 38 10.00% 
2004 20 5.26% 
TOTAL 380 100.00% 
 
Table 5, Panel B  
 
Number of Bankrupt Portfolio Companies, Percentage of Total Sub-Sample in Each Period of 
Duration of Life  
 
Duration Number of Companies % 
1 14 7.37% 
2 38 20.00% 
3 39 20.53% 
4 24 12.63% 
5 16 8.42% 
6 13 6.84% 
7 13 6.84% 
8 7 3.68% 
9 10 5.26% 
10 5 2.63% 
11 6 3.16% 
12 5 2.63% 
TOTAL 190 100.00% 
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Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the variables used to test the hypotheses.  In 
addition, the two groups that comprise the full sample are investigated: namely, healthy and 
bankrupt portfolio companies. The data is right-skewed for the healthy companies and is the 
same for the bankrupt companies, except for the MB ratio, which is left-skewed. The full sample 
follows the same trends of the sub-samples of right-skewed data except for the MB ratio. 
 
Table 6  
Summary Statistics for Original Sample  
 
Success   Fail   Total 
Success/Fail 
Mean Median   Mean Median   N Mean Median 
RECENTMN 2.80 1.48  2.80 1.50  380 2.80 1.50 
RECENTMD 1.83 1.00  1.98 1.00  380 1.91 1.00 
PCAVMN 109.31 91.04  115.98 97.52  380 112.65 93.40 
PCMXMN 28.02 24.47  29.46 24.67  380 28.74 24.56 
PCAVMD 91.07 77.20  95.95 76.52  380 93.51 76.94 
PCMXMD 22.21 16.38  25.43 17.92  380 23.82 17.04 
AGE 20.23 19.23  19.75 18.50  380 19.99 18.75 
MB 0.44 0.34  -0.41 0.11  380 0.02 0.26 
IND 0.84 1.00  0.86 1.00  380 0.85 1.00 
SALES 253.51 65.07  119.22 17.91  380 186.37 37.48 
ASSETS 331.42 130.87  310.04 38.85  355 321.42 76.22 
RNDS 1.69 1.50   1.60 1.50   380 1.64 1.50 
 
Comparing the two sub-samples, the VCs of the bankrupt companies have more 
investment participation (PCAVMN, PCMXMN, PCAVMD and PCMXMD) than the healthy 
ones. This is expected since they act as financiers as well as consultants. Bankrupt companies 
require more financing than healthy ones, since they cannot generate enough revenue to survive. 
The ratio MB is significantly different between the two groups. The mean for the bankrupt 
companies is negative and equal to 0.41, while the median is 0.11. This is due to the negative 
tangible common equity they have. The mean and median for healthy companies are 0.44 and 
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0.34 respectively. SALES for the healthy companies is also more than twice that of bankrupt 
firms. The mean of healthy firms is $253.51 million, while for the bankrupt firms it is only 
$119.22 million. 
Empirical Results 
To answer the questions raised and test the hypotheses explained earlier, the tests are 
divided into two parts: the first one examines the full sample of bankrupt (defunct) and healthy 
companies, while the second examines the sub-sample of bankrupt companies only.  
 Table 7 shows the results of a LOGIT analysis. The sample consists of 190 bankrupt 
portfolio companies matched with 190 healthy companies. The dependent variable SUCCESS is 
a dummy variable equal to “one” if the company is healthy and “zero” if the company is defunct. 
In column 1, the RNDS is also positive and marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This shows that monitoring has a positive impact on the likelihood of success for VC-backed 
companies, as predicted by the hypothesis. The SALES variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with the previous literature since larger 
amount of sales is expected increase the likelihood of the company’s survival.  
 Columns 2 and 3 follow the results of column 1 in both statistical and economic 
significance, except for the variable of the number of rounds (RNDS), which becomes 
insignificant. In column 4, the participation involvement variable (PCMXMD) is statistically 
significant and negative. The negative sign is not consistent with the predictable hypothesis 
(H1A). This result needs more research to reveal the reasons behind its negativity and hence we 
leave it for future research. 
 None of the other variables are significant in terms of the four regressions in Table 7. As 
predicted, the financial leverage ratio (DE) is statistically insignificant. This is consistent with 
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the prediction (H4A), because of the irrelevancy of debt dependency. AGE is also insignificant, 
but it is inconsistent with the predictable hypothesis (H3A). The industry classification (IND) as a 
high-tech company is insignificant, which suggests that the industry has no effect on the 
probability of bankruptcy. The characteristics of VCs proxied by the recent success of IPOs 
(RECENTMN and RECENTMD) and investment participation (PCAVMN, PCMXMN, 
PCAVMD and PCMXMD) are insignificant. These unpredicted insignificant results show that 
there are external factors that affect bankruptcy. The characteristics and behavior (or motivation) 
of VCs do not overcome those external factors.  
Table 8 shows that although the VC’s motivation, behavior and characteristics were not 
significant factors in predicting bankruptcy, the VC is a significant factor in extending the life of 
a failed portfolio company. This is consistent with the main objective of VCs, which is to 
maximize gains and minimize losses. In addition, by using VC experience, professional 
networking and equity financing strategies, the life of these portfolio companies can be extended. 
RECENT (proxied by RECENTMN and RECENTMD) is negative and significant at the 
1% level in all four regressions. This is consistent with the predictable hypothesis (H2SA). This 
means that the lack of recent success will motivate VCs to extend the life of their portfolio 
companies as much as possible. Reporting failing companies affects the reputation of VCs and 
decreases their ability to raise future funds. The investment of a VC’s PER is statistically 
significant except when the PCAVMD variable is used.  
The experience of VCs (AGE) is positive and significant in all of the regressions. This is 
consistent with the prediction (H3SA) and with previous literature. The results suggest that the 
higher the number of years of experience, the better the ability to affect the duration of the life of  
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Table 7  
 
LOGIT Analysis Results  
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -0.3304 0.4277  -0.3006 0.4842  -0.3389 0.4151  -0.2415 0.5634 
RECENTMN 0.0085 0.7704  0.0030 0.9166       
RECENTMD       -0.0079 0.8290  -0.0132 0.7195 
PCAVMN -0.0016 0.2154          
PCMXMN    -0.0063 0.2551       
PCAVMD       -0.0013 0.3257    
PCMXMD          -0.0089 0.0729 
AGE -0.0035 0.5120  -0.0040 0.4862  -0.0033 0.5040  -0.0041 0.4532 
DE -0.0049 0.5379  -0.0041 0.5145  -0.0043 0.5202  -0.0040 0.5057 
MB 0.0011 0.3949  0.0009 0.3803  0.0010 0.3798  0.0009 0.3643 
IND -0.0649 0.8369  -0.0493 0.8752  -0.0444 0.8882  -0.0474 0.8804 
SALES 0.0008 0.0129  0.0008 0.0135  0.0008 0.0133  0.0008 0.0146 
RNDS 0.2785 0.0883  0.2726 0.0943  0.2631 0.1040  0.2749 0.0886 
            
Log Likelihood -255.6382   -255.7706   -255.9228   -263.3959  
P-value 0.0499   0.0545   0.0602   0.0273   
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Table 8  
 
OLS Regression Results  
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value
CONSTANT 0.2343 0.8621  0.3687 0.7922  -0.9359 0.5070  -1.1374 0.4252 
LNRECENTMN -1.4630 0.0000  -1.5026 0.0000       
LNRECENTMD       -1.8456 0.0000  -1.8772 0.0000 
PCAVMN -0.0039 0.0279          
PCMXMN    -0.0139 0.0716       
PCAVMD       -0.0042 0.0482    
PCMXMD          -0.0099 0.1720 
LNAGE 2.2273 0.0000  2.1885 0.0000  2.6791 0.0000  2.6948 0.0000 
DE 0.0049 0.6959  0.0102 0.4096  0.0135 0.2963  0.0155 0.2344 
MB -0.0004 0.8294  -0.0012 0.5086  -0.0017 0.3956  -0.0019 0.3224 
IND -1.2015 0.0152  -1.1863 0.0169  -1.4944 0.0037  -1.4330 0.0055 
LNSALES 0.0194 0.8038  0.0088 0.9107  0.0860 0.2915  0.0826 0.3144 
LNRNDS 0.3298 0.4707  0.2783 0.5427  0.2783 0.5550  0.2361 0.6178 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.4433   0.4383   0.39504   0.38818  
P-value 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
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a portfolio company. As expected, the financial leverage variables (DE) is not significant, since 
portfolio companies depend on equity for their financing. This result is confirmed by the 
insignificance of the sales variable, which shows that these companies are not able to produce 
enough revenue for their survival; hence, they depend on their VCs (H4SA).  
The industry type is an important factor in extending the life of a bankrupt company. IND 
is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the company is high-tech and “zero” otherwise. IND is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. The monitoring variable proxied 
RNDS is insignificant in all of the regressions (H5SA) due to the lag between monitoring and the 
outcome.  
Robustness Checks 
 The LOGIT analysis reported in Table 9 is suspected to suffer from potential bias.11 
Specifically, there are two issues involved: endogeneity and sample selection bias. First, there 
may be an endogeneity created by the omission of an important variable, which results in 
spurious conclusions. This is because one or more variables in the original LOGIT analysis may 
be affected by such an omission. The suggested variable is a proxy that controls the ability of 
VCs to be involved in the decision-making of portfolio companies. One possible variable is the 
percentage of VC ownership of the portfolio company at the time of the IPO. This variable can 
only be obtained through prospectuses, and it is not available through any database to which the 
University of New Orleans subscribes. Hence, the robustness check cannot use that specific 
variable. However, another variable was used to assess the control of VCs in their portfolio 
companies: seats reserved on the board of directors.  
                                                 
11 I thank Dr. Sudha Krishnaswami and the participants in the dissertation workshop for pointing out this potential 
bias.  
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 In the suggested robustness check, the LOGIT analysis will use the variable EXEC% that 
is measured by the division of the number of non-managing board members by the total number 
of board members. It is assumed that VCs do not participate in day-to-day operations and hence 
do not assume direct management positions, but they do control strategic decisions through 
reserving non-managing board seats. This proxy is expected to capture the power of VCs over 
their portfolio companies.  
 The second concern is the matching sample selection bias. It is suspected that some 
portfolio companies in the matching sample are not healthy, so it would be incorrect to 
benchmark these companies against the troubled companies. To correct for this bias, if it exists, 
the LOGIT analysis will use only the matching sample of companies that did not file for 
bankruptcy for four or more years after the year of delisting of the troubled portfolio companies. 
Four years seems a reasonable amount of time for two reasons. First, five years will bias the 
sample because the LOGIT analysis has to eliminate the year 2001 and all subsequent years.12 If 
the year 2001 and subsequent years are eliminated from the LOGIT analysis, only about 37% of 
the original sample will be used, which will lead to sample bias. As discussed earlier, the largest 
percentage of delistings occurred in 2001. And second, three years of health is a short period of 
time. Therefore, the selection of four years after the delisting of the troubled portfolio company 
is believed to be the optimum number of years for the matching sample to prove to be healthy.  
 Table 9 repeats the LOGIT analysis as in Table 7 with the above two differences. 
Namely, it adds the EXEC% variable and finishes the delistings as of 2001. None of the 
companies delisted after 2001 was included in this LOGIT analysis. The results are very similar 
                                                 
12 A follow-up has been conducted by ensuring that all of the companies included in the matching sample were not 
delisted because of  bankruptcy/reorganization as of 12/31/2005.  
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Table 9  
 
Robustness Check for LOGIT Analysis (as in Table 7) 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -1.3750 0.0844  -1.2603 0.1191  -1.3855 0.0816  -1.3165 0.0986
RECENTMN 0.0097 0.8029  0.0006 0.9870       
RECENTMD       -0.0011 0.9817  -0.0115 0.8197
PCAVMN -0.0017 0.3311          
PCMXMN    -0.0097 0.2083       
PCAVMD       -0.0016 0.3855    
PCMXMD          -0.0101 0.1207
AGE 0.0149 0.5285  0.0132 0.5768  0.0154 0.5153  0.0155 0.5114
DE 0.1861 0.1256  0.1934 0.1165  0.1838 0.1314  0.1945 0.1175
MB 0.0192 0.2320  0.0186 0.2447  0.0191 0.2348  0.0195 0.2229
IND 0.2683 0.5890  0.2698 0.5876  0.2784 0.5764  0.2960 0.5535
SALES 0.0014 0.0394  0.0013 0.0405  0.0014 0.0390  0.0014 0.0422
RNDS 0.5222 0.0442  0.5388 0.0400  0.5189 0.0450  0.5321 0.0402
EXEC% 0.0018 0.7893  0.0024 0.7206  0.0017 0.7974  0.0022 0.7372
            
Log Likelihood -265.0557     -264.4118     -265.2914     -263.5814   
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to that of Table 7. Again, the two main variables that are statistically significant are SALES and 
RNDS. 
 Another suspicion is related to the OLS analysis. The results of Table 8 may be biased if 
the DURATION is affected by unaccounted for (omitted) variables from the regression. These 
variables are related to exogenous factors that are not company- or VC-specific. To test for this 
bias, the sample period is divided into three different periods: from 1990 to 1993 (YR9093), 
from 1994 to 1996 (YR9496) and from 1997 to 2000 (YR9700). Therefore, two variables were 
added to the OLS regression and the analysis was repeated. YR9093 is a dummy variable that is 
equal to “one” if the company filed for an IPO during 1990, 1991, 1992 or 1993; otherwise it is 
equal to “zero.” YR9497 is a dummy variable that is equal to “one” if the company filed for an 
IPO during 1994, 1995 or 1996; otherwise it is equal to “zero.” 
 Table 10 shows the results of this robustness check. All of the hypotheses hold except for 
H1A. The PER variable was expected to be positive, but it became insignificant in all four 
regressions except for PCAVMD. This result suggests that, when the dummy variables were 
grouped to distinguish between “hot” and “cold” IPO times, PER becomes insignificant. This 
may be due to the introduction of the supply and demand of funds, which is proxied by the 
market activity (“hot” vs. “cold”). In this case, the percentage of investment (high or low 
investment activity) is determined by the supply of funds to VCs.  
 Another difference in these checks is a change in significance of the control variables. 
SALES turned out to be significant in three of the four regressions, compared to being 
insignificant in the original test. Also, IND (dummy for industry) is now insignificant. This could 
be because the market activity (“hot” vs. “cold”) proxies for the amount of high-tech companies 
introduced to the market during such periods, and so SALES becomes an important factor in
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Table 10  
 
Robustness Check for OLS Analysis (as in Table 8) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -1.9642 0.1557  -1.8931 0.1868  -2.9105 0.0325  0.2973 0.8269 
LNRECMN -1.0683 0.0000  -1.0816 0.0000       
LNRECMD       -1.4062 0.0000  -1.4152 0.0000 
PCAVMN -0.0022 0.1879          
PCMXMN    -0.0081 0.2575       
PCAVMD       -0.0033 0.0780    
PCMXMD          -0.0066 0.3058 
LNAGE 2.0780 0.0000  2.0604 0.0000  2.3155 0.0000  2.3622 0.0000 
DE -0.0046 0.6661  -0.0016 0.8742  0.0000 0.9991  0.0013 0.9051 
MB 0.0008 0.6093  0.0004 0.8196  0.0001 0.9297  0.0000 0.9769 
IND -0.5504 0.2159  -0.5470 0.2198  -0.6052 0.1774  -0.5409 0.2287 
LNSALES 0.1366 0.0838  0.1260 0.1083  0.2315 0.0041  0.2209 0.0063 
LNRNDS 0.0156 0.9702  0.0013 0.9976  0.0320 0.9385  0.0128 0.9756 
YR9093 3.1940 0.0000  3.2172 0.0000  3.4737 0.0000  -2.2364 0.0000 
YR9496 1.0111 0.0072  1.0439 0.0054  1.2816 0.0006  -3.5058 0.0000 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.6179   0.6167   0.6131   0.6078  
P-value 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
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determining the DURATION of portfolio companies. These changes in control variables did not 
affect the analysis of the hypotheses.  
Conclusions 
The venture capital industry has grown rapidly since the early 1980s when the “New 
Prudent Investor Rule” rule was issued. This rule allowed institutional investors to enter the 
venture capital industry. Since then, the industry has attracted many scholars and professionals. 
Although venture capital has undergone studies that have attempted to investigate and 
understand how it works, these did not cover all of its aspects. This study investigates the 
monitoring of portfolio companies by their venture capitalists and how the unique characteristics 
of the industry affect troubled VC-backed companies. The motivation of the paper is to 
investigate the effect of venture capitalists on VC-backed public troubled companies. The issues 
raised in this essay have not been tested previously; hence, this study will fill part of the gap in 
the literature.  
The first section reveals that VC monitoring of portfolio companies has a positive effect 
on the success of those companies. Moreover, a low amount of sales is the main predictor of 
bankruptcy. This is consistent with previous research concluding that VC-backed companies 
generate more revenue than non-VC-backed companies. As expected, financial leverage is not a 
significant factor in predicting bankruptcy for VC-backed portfolio companies.  
The second section researches the partial effect of VCs on extending the life of their 
portfolio companies, which means that VCs can only affect their portfolio companies for a 
limited amount of time. This effect depends on the reputation, experience and behavior of VCs. 
The results show that more experienced VCs and VCs whose portfolio companies have not gone 
public during the previous two years tend to extend the life of their bankrupt portfolio 
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companies. A higher level of monitoring does not have a significant effect on extending the life 
of a failed portfolio companies. The high-tech industry has a negative effect on the duration of 
life, while as expected, financial leverage is insignificant in affecting the life of bankrupt 
portfolio companies. 
This study confirms that VCs continue to have an effect on the companies in which they 
have invested, even after they go public. In addition, the study specifies the key factors that 
affect the success of VC-backed companies and the effect on the life of bankrupt portfolio 
companies.  
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Chapter 4: U.S. Venture Capitalists and International Investments 
 
 
 Venture capitalists (VCs) always look for the best deal to maximize their profits. One 
way to find the best deals and thus maximize returns is to invest internationally as well as 
domestically. Previous research confirms the importance of the close proximity of portfolio 
companies to their venture capitalists. Contrary to previous research studies, the case of 
international investments highlights the fact that U.S.-based venture capitalists are thousands of 
miles away from their portfolio companies. This location expansion is expected to affect VCs’ 
monitoring techniques as well as their characteristics. Experienced and larger VCs are 
hypothetically more likely to invest internationally than newer and smaller ones. In addition, 
VCs are more likely to syndicate their international investments, since that would minimize their 
risk. Finally, it is predicted that VCs would tighten their monitoring techniques, such as 
providing a greater number of funding rounds with a lower amount of capital per round, hence 
emphasizing the staging of financing. The study reveals that, currently, U.S. VCs syndicate with 
a lower number of VC firms and funds, which is negatively related to the likelihood of success. 
Moreover, the study reveals that U.S.-based VCs should intervene more in the activities of their 
international portfolio companies and should not delegate their duties to foreign VC funds.
  
 
46
 
 
“Ever since companies began to shift work overseas, outsourcing has been portrayed as a killer 
of good-paying U.S. jobs. But now executives are discovering how outsourcing can not only cut 
costs but also boost quality and even create new types of jobs at home.”  
Pete Engardio (2006) 
 
 
Introduction 
Recent professional literature has highlighted the recent move by venture capitalists 
toward investing internationally. Sheahan (2004) stated that VCs continue to make more 
international investments, investing $761 million into Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)13 
startups in the first half of 2004, up from $495 million during the same period in 2003. This 
chapter investigates the characteristics of domestic U.S. venture capital funds that invest in 
international portfolio companies and how the monitoring techniques of venture capitalists are 
affected by international investments.  
Previous literature points to the importance in the investment of physical proximity 
between a venture capitalist and his/her portfolio company (Lerner, 1995). Close proximity (a 
few miles) to the portfolio company allows the VC to visit it more often and monitor it better. 
Extant literature does not describe how monitoring would change if the VC were U.S.-based and 
had an investee thousands of miles away. This study fills that gap and studies the impact of 
distance on other VC monitoring tools such as staging of finances and increasing the number of 
rounds of financing to offset the distance barrier. This study also investigates the characteristics 
of VCs that invest in portfolio companies with respect to factors like experience, industry and 
syndication.  
 
                                                 
13 Also known as “offshoring” services (Sheahan, 2004). 
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Related Literature 
A review of the literature comparing the U.S. VC industry to VC counterparts in other 
countries shows that VCs operate differently if they invest outside of their domestic market. The 
literature on monitoring the involvement by VCs of their portfolio companies based on 
geographic proximity is also reviewed. 
Studies point to differences between U.S. and international venture capitalists that impact 
how they behave with their portfolio companies. For example, Wang, Wang and Lu (2002) 
found that VCs’ equity stakeholding, board seats and IPO timing were all beneficial components 
that they brought to the portfolio companies. In a comparative study, they found that 
Singaporean VC participation in their portfolio companies was significant but still lagged behind 
the U.S. 
Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) compared VC governance in the U.S., the U.K., 
the Netherlands and France. Regression results revealed that VCs were driven by different 
factors in different markets, and that VCs in France were the least involved as well as the least 
likely to add value to portfolio companies. 
 The involvement of VCs in portfolio company management has also been widely 
documented. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) illustrated that VCs are members of the board of 
directors and typically have the power to fire senior management. Lerner (1995) found that the 
representation of venture capitalists increases around events such as CEO turnover, and that VCs 
try to minimize the cost of oversight by supervising local firms. Therefore, VCs are likely to 
have a director nearby, and proximity is an important factor in board membership.  
As expected, poor performance among portfolio companies does not appear to result in 
greater monitoring than good performers receive (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996). 
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Consistent with Lerner (1995), VCs are likely to engage in a face-to-face oversight of their 
investments, especially in early stage ventures and in the presence of uncertainties (Sapienza, 
Manigart and Vermeir, 1996). Bygrave (1987 and 1988) showed that the level of uncertainty was 
directly correlated with co-investing14 and information-sharing among venture capitalists, as the 
members of these networks typically share resources. Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) and 
Bygrave (1987 and 1988) demonstrated that VCs can control risk by specializing in a specific 
stage and industry, thus increasing their knowledge levels, and then gain access to network, 
information and deal flows from other VCs.  
Engaging in international investments in a pioneer manner may cause VCs to experience 
fewer networking activities compared to domestic investments. The loss of the networking asset 
may discourage a VC from going international. Some studies, though, suggest that distance could 
be insignificant. Petersen and Rajan (2002) found that the distance between commercial banks 
and small business customers carried less magnitude as technological advancement improved. 
This trait may apply to the venture capital industry.  
Predictable Hypotheses and Methodology  
It is expected that the role in this case will be different for portfolio companies located 
only a few miles away from their VCs. The following hypotheses formulate the research 
questions of this essay. 
 Hypothesis 1: Seasoned venture capitalists will invest more internationally. Seasoned 
VCs (FMAGE) have accumulated the experience needed to take more risks and can better handle 
complex situations. Inexperienced VCs will be busy trying to accumulate knowledge and to 
develop networks to manage and monitor domestic portfolio companies. 
                                                 
14 Co-investing refers to the sharing of investments among a group of VCs. Typically, there is a lead VC who invites 
the other VCs to participate in an investment. 
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H10: The experience of VC firms is unrelated to the likelihood of investing 
internationally. 
H1A: The experience of VC firms (FMAGE) is significant and positively 
related to the likelihood of investing internationally (INTL). 
 
FMAGE will be used to proxy for the VC’s experience. Lerner (1994) used this proxy to 
differentiate between seasoned and inexperienced VCs. The study expects that FMAGE is 
directly related to a VC’s tendency to invest internationally (INTL). Experience can proxy for 
knowledge acquired by VCs, and it is expected that the more knowledge acquired, the better the 
ability to engage in riskier investments.  
 Hypothesis 2: Larger VC funds (FDINV) will have a greater tendency to invest 
internationally (INTL) because their portfolios are large enough to balance risks from both 
domestic and international investments.  
H20: The size of the venture capital fund is unrelated to the probability of 
investing internationally. 
H2A: The larger the venture capital fund (FDINV), the higher the tendency to 
invest internationally (INTL) as well as domestically. 
 
The size of a VC fund, measured as the fund’s total investments (FDINV), is an 
important factor in deciding about investment in risky projects. Larger funds are willing to take 
more risks than smaller ones, because they have a larger number of portfolio companies in their 
funds. In other words, their investment portfolios are more diversified and can bear the added 
risk of international investments (INTL). It is expected that large VC funds will tend to invest 
more in international portfolio companies compared to smaller VC funds.    
 Hypothesis 3: Venture capitalists are expected to monitor their international portfolio 
companies more closely. Specifically, the amount invested in the international investee per round 
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(RNDS$) will be smaller than that for a domestic portfolio company, and the number of rounds 
(RNDS) will be higher for an international portfolio company than for a domestic one. 
H30: Techniques for monitoring international investments are the same as 
domestic techniques. 
H3A: VCs will have a larger monitoring effect (more RNDS and less RNDS$) 
if it is an international portfolio company (INTL) rather than a domestic 
portfolio company. 
  
The monitoring techniques used by VCs are the number of rounds (RNDS) and the 
average dollar value given to the portfolio company per round (RNDS$). In each round, it is 
expected that the portfolio company will update the VC about the status of the company. Since 
the international portfolio company is further away from the VC, they will require as many 
reports as possible. Monitoring can be tightened by increasing the number of rounds and by 
awarding less funding per round.Therefore, it is expected that an international portfolio company 
will have a positive relation with number of rounds (RNDS) and a negative one with the average 
dollar value per round (RNDS$). 
 Hypothesis 4: VCs are engaged in network interaction, thereby sharing resources. In 
addition, investing internationally means more risk. Therefore, VCs would try to syndicate their 
international investments among the network. In other words, they will try to divide that risk 
among more participants than they would in a domestic investment. Lerner (1994) showed that 
VCs tend to syndicate with one another in the first round of funding. This is because syndication 
is a device by which the established VC obtains information to decide whether or not to invest in 
risky firms. 
H40: There are no syndication differences between a VC’s international 
investments and domestic investments.  
H4A: A VC will syndicate (NOFM/NOFD) his/her international investments 
(INTL) more than his/her domestic investments. 
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There are two proxies used: the number of VC firms (NOFM) and the number of VC 
funds (NOFD). If investing internationally incurs more risk than domestic investment, and 
assuming that VCs are rational investors (i.e., risk-averse), then they will try to decrease their 
own risk. This syndication is also coupled with sharing opinions (certification of the quality of 
investments, or a second opinion) as discussed above (Lerner, 1994). Hence, syndication is 
expected to be more pronounced in international investments than in domestic investments. 
Therefore, syndication will have a positive relation with international investments. By sharing 
risk and obtaining external opinions from other VCs, the probability of SUCCESS is expected to 
be higher. Thus, syndication variables are expected to be positively related to the probability of 
success. 
 Hypothesis 5: One disadvantage of the monitoring techniques described above is the time 
lag between the portfolio company’s actual occurrence of problems and its report to its VC. As 
location may be an obstacle to effective monitoring, VCs may try to find other methods to 
effectively monitor investments thousands of miles away. One such method is to collaborate with 
and delegate the monitoring to a foreign counterpart. 
H50: Delegation of monitoring (EXEC% and FOR%) is not a technique used 
by U.S. VCs to effectively monitor their foreign investments. 
H5A: A U.S. VC will not monitor his/her international investments (INTL) him/herself, 
but will delegate (EXEC% and FOR%) it to a foreign VC counterpart. 
 
Two things must occur to prove the delegation hypothesis. First, the percentage of non-
managing directors as a portion of the total number of directors (EXEC%) will be smaller in the 
case of delegation because only the agent VC will sit on the board of directors. Second, the 
percentage of foreign VC funds to the total number of funds (FOR%) invested in the portfolio 
company must be higher in the case of delegation. As a result, it is expected that international 
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investments (INTL) would have a negative relation with the percentage of non-managing 
directors (EXEC%) and a positive one with the percentage of foreign VC funds (FOR%). The 
same predictions are expected in terms of the likelihood of success of the foreign investment. 
In this essay, two logistic models are used (Appendix II summarizes the logistic models):  
LOGIT analysis I 
εβββ
ββββββα
+++
+++++++=
+−
++−++
%%
/$
987
654321
FOREXECIND
FDINVNOFDNOFMRNDSRNDSCOAGEFMAGEINTL
 
 
Where: 
• INTL is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the portfolio company is an international 
portfolio company funded by a U.S. VC fund, and “zero” otherwise. 
• FMAGE is the age of the venture capital firm, measured in years. This is a proxy for the 
experience of the VC. 
• COAGE is the age of the portfolio company, measured in years. This is a proxy for the 
establishment/experience of the portfolio company. 
• RNDS refers to the number of rounds the VC used to fund that portfolio company. 
• RNDS$ is the average U.S. dollar amount in millions per round. 
• FDINV is the average size of a VC fund’s investment (in U.S.$ millions) that is invested 
in all portfolio company by that specific fund. This is a proxy for the fund size.  
• IND is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the VC specializes in the high-tech industry 
and “zero” otherwise. 
• EXEC% is the percentage of the non-managing members of the board of directors to the 
total number of the board of directors. 
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• FOR% is the percentage of foreign VC funds to the total number of VC funds that are 
invested in the portfolio company. 
• ε  is the random error term. 
 
The first logistic model predicts the relationship between VC characteristics and 
monitoring techniques and the probability that VCs will fund international companies rather than 
domestic ones. The model estimates that there will be a positive relation between VC experience 
and international investment. Moreover, international investments will be characterized by more 
monitoring efforts by VCs than domestic counterparts. Since investing internationally is regarded 
as  a riskier investment than investing domestically, there will be tendency for VCs to reduce 
risk. Hence, the model predicts that large VCs will be more willing to invest internationally and 
will try to syndicate their investments among other VCs. 
LOGIT analysis II 
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• Where SUCCESS is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the company has gone public 
and “zero” otherwise. 
 
The second logistic regression measures the relation between the probability of success of 
international investments, VC characteristics and the monitoring techniques used. This model 
utilizes a sub-sample that includes international portfolio companies only. The model simply 
shows the best practices that can be followed by VCs to enjoy a higher probability of success. In 
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the latter part of the paper, these two models will be compared in order to highlight the policy 
implications and possible changes to VC practices. 
Data and Sample Selection  
The data have been collected from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
VentureXpert. The VentureXpert database consists of segments that differentiate between firms, 
funds and portfolio companies’ variables. This study utilizes the portfolio company segment of 
the SDC VentureXpert database. The sample collected is restricted to U.S.-based VC funds that 
invest in international portfolio companies (located in any country other than the U.S.). The 
sample consists of funds created from the period of 1/1/1990 to 12/31/2004. A matching sample 
was collected that has the same restrictions, except it includes VC funds that invest in U.S. 
portfolio companies instead of international ones.  
 The collected variables reveal the specific mechanisms used to monitor international 
investments. More specific data, such as accounting data about international portfolio companies, 
were difficult to obtain, since the SDC database does not include a complete set of accounting 
variables for the portfolio companies.  
Another significant problem with the VentureXpert database is the discrepancy of the 
data reported for the same company. This is because the compiled data are based on voluntary 
submission by venture capitalists. To minimize this problem, companies that submitted 
conflicting data were eliminated.  
The total sample collected, after eliminating the discrepancy data, consists of 18,372 
companies. This number is divided into 4,307 international portfolio companies that are funded 
by one or more U.S.-based VC funds and 14,065 U.S. domestic companies that are funded by 
one or more U.S.-based VC funds.  
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Summary Statistics 
Table 10 illustrates investment target countries and the frequency of investment by U.S.-
based VC funds in terms of investment in portfolio companies. The preferred country for U.S.-
based VCs is the United Kingdom, with a total of 821 portfolio companies, or 19.06% of the 
total number of international portfolio companies. This is because of the lack of a language 
barrier and the healthy economy in the UK, which is regarded as one of Europe’s most imporatnt 
financial hub. The second most preferred country is Canada, with a total of 416 companies, or 
9.66% of the total number of international portfolio companies. Other countries that are preferred 
by U.S. VC funds are France, South Korea, Germany, Israel, Australia, India, Japan, Sweden and 
China. Additional preferred countries are presented in Table 10. In addition, the table reveals that 
Latin America is not yet a preferred destination for VCs compared to other parts of the world. 
The first country to appear is Brazil, ranked 23rd with only 32 investments, equal to 0.74% of the 
total number of international portfolio companies.  
 
Table 11  
Preferred Countries for U.S.-Based VCs and the Number of Portfolio Companies per Country 
 
Rank Nation 
 
Number of Portfolio 
Companies 
Percentage 
of Total 
1 United Kingdom 821 19.06% 
2 Canada 416 9.66% 
3 France 408 9.47% 
4 South Korea 281 6.52% 
5 Germany 268 6.22% 
6 Israel 232 5.39% 
7 Australia 224 5.20% 
8 India 158 3.67% 
9 Japan 138 3.20% 
10 Sweden 138 3.20% 
11 China 122 2.83% 
12 Ireland 96 2.23% 
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Table 11 (Continued)   
    
Rank Nation 
 
Number of Portfolio 
Companies 
Percentage 
of Total 
13 Netherlands 92 2.14% 
14 Finland 79 1.83% 
15 Switzerland 77 1.79% 
16 Singapore 73 1.69% 
17 Belgium 71 1.65% 
18 Hong Kong 59 1.37% 
19 Denmark 55 1.28% 
20 Taiwan 53 1.23% 
21 Italy 49 1.14% 
22 Spain 43 1.00% 
23 Brazil 32 0.74% 
24 Norway 30 0.70% 
25 Poland 29 0.67% 
26 Austria 28 0.65% 
27 New Zealand 24 0.56% 
27 Argentina 21 0.49% 
 Other 190 4.41% 
 Total International 4307 100.00% 
 United States 14065  
 TOTAL 18372  
 
Table 12 presents the summary statistics and shows the mean and median for the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The table is divided into three parts: international 
companies, U.S.-based companies and the total sample. Moreover, the table shows the results of 
equality of means and equality of variances between the two independent samples. The two 
samples have unequal means except for the variable COAGE, and have unequal variances except 
for FMAGE. The average rate of success (SUCCESS), delisted as public company, for 
international investments is 13%, compared to 10.68% for domestic investments. These VCs that 
invest internationally could be motivated by their higher rates of success. The mean age of VC 
firms that invest internationally is slightly higher than of those that are domestic (19.89 vs. 19.11 
years), as is the mean age of the international portfolio companies vis-à-vis domestic companies 
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(8.92 vs. 8.65 years). It may be that VC firms invest internationally to enhance their reputations. 
Older VCs are more capable of benefiting from a good reputation, leading to a washout in the 
age variable. On the other hand, portfolio firms have similar roles regardless of their country 
domination. A review of the summary statistics of the variables of monitoring techniques reveals 
significant differences. On the one hand, the number of funding rounds (RNDS) for international 
companies is fewer than for domestic companies (2.54 vs. 3.25 rounds). However, international 
portfolio companies receive more funding per round (RNDS$) than U.S. companies ($15.3 
million vs. $10.94 million).  
VC funds also seem to syndicate (NOFM/NOFD) domestic investments more than 
international ones. The number of firms and funds that participate in domestic investments (4.8 
U.S. VC firms and 5.87 U.S. VC funds) is greater than participation in international investments 
(3.67 U.S. VC firms and 4.25 U.S. VC funds).  
The summary statistics reveal, in contrast to expectations, that smaller U.S. VC firms 
invest internationally and that these investees undergo fewer funding rounds and more dollar 
funding per round, with a lower level of syndication than domestic investments. In addition, the 
percentage of companies that are high-tech as compared to total portfolio companies is much 
higher for domestic ones (50.35% vs. 42.79% for international investments).  
As expected by the delegation hypotheses (EXEC% and FOR%), VCs that invest 
internationally do not reserve many seats on the board of directors of the investee, but instead 
delegate monitoring to a one or a few foreign VC funds. The percentage of foreign VC funds to 
total funds is much higher in the case of an international investment compared to a domestic one 
(48.86% vs. 4.42%). The percentage of non-managing directors compared to the total number of 
directors is 20.92% for international portfolio companies and 4.42% for domestic companies. 
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Table 12  
 
Summary Statistics  
 
  
International  
Companies   
U.S.  
Companies  Total Sample   
Equality  
of Means  
Equality  
of Variances 
  Mean Median   Mean Median  Mean Median   t-test P-Value  F-test P-Value 
SUCCESS 0.1303 0.0000  0.1068 0.0000  0.1123 0.0000  4.2692 0.0000  70.8066 0.0000 
FMAGE 19.8387 19.0000  19.1132 18.8000  19.2833 19.0000  4.5170 0.0000  0.1316 0.7168 
COAGE 8.9252 6.0000  8.6562 7.0000  8.7190 6.0000  1.4904 0.1361  19.3866 0.0000 
RNDS 2.5410 2.0000  3.2515 3.0000  3.0849 2.0000  -17.7005 0.0000  259.8817 0.0000 
RNDS$ 15.3074 3.9000  10.9422 5.3550  11.9655 5.0000  5.2778 0.0000  122.1007 0.0000 
NOFM 3.6678 3.0000  4.8162 4.0000  4.5470 3.0000  -18.7106 0.0000  648.1061 0.0000 
NOFD 4.2547 3.0000  5.8672 4.0000  5.4892 4.0000  -19.7670 0.0000  709.9555 0.0000 
FDINV 12.4315 10.4590  66.6960 6.3552  53.9747 7.1531  -9.8929 0.0000  377.5644 0.0000 
IND 0.4279 0.0000  0.5038 1.0000  0.4860 0.0000  -8.7372 0.0000  294.1812 0.0000 
EXEC% 20.9239 0.0000  29.8357 33.3333  27.7465 30.0000  161.3502 0.0000  -21.3755 0.0000 
FOR% 46.8570 50.0000  4.4177 0.0000  14.3669 0.0000   147.0892 0.0000  5295.2696 0.0000 
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Empirical Results 
This section interprets the results of the LOGIT analysis conducted to uncover the 
monitoring techniques and characteristics of venture capitalists. Table 13 uncovers the relation 
between investing internationally (INTL) and monitoring techniques used, such as the number of 
rounds (RNDS) and the average funding per round (RNDS$). In addition, in two regressions 
Table 13 also includes the variables that test the delegation hypothesis (EXEC% and FOR%). 
Moreover, Table 14 reveals the determinants of success rates (SUCCESS) among international 
portfolio companies (INTL).  
 Table 13 uses a LOGIT analysis to highlight the relation between the decision to invest 
internationally (by U.S. VC funds) and the monitoring techniques used, as well as VCs’ 
characteristics. In this analysis the dependent variable is INTL, which is a dummy variable equal 
to “one” when the portfolio company is located in a country other than the U.S. and “zero” 
otherwise.  
Results shown in column 1 suggest that the age of the VC firm proxied for experience 
(FMAGE), the number of funding rounds (RNDS), the number of VC firms (NOFM), the 
number of VC funds (NOFD), VC fund size (FDINV) and classification as high-tech (IND) are 
all statistically and economically significant.   
AGE is positive and statistically significant. This proves the first hypothesis (H1A) that 
the more experience the VC firm has, the higher the likelihood of investment in an international 
portfolio company. The age of the portfolio company is also positive. Although marginally 
statistically and economically significant, it suggests that VCs prefer to invest in more mature 
portfolio companies than in younger ones. This is expected because it is easier to monitor and 
control an older company than a younger one.  
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Both of the two variables of monitoring (RNDS and RNDS$) are statistically significant. 
The results of this analysis are not consistent with the third hypothesis (H3A) of tightened 
monitoring techniques. Actually, the results suggest that VCs do not tighten their monitoring. 
Hence, the number of rounds is negatively related to the investment of an international portfolio 
company, contrary to the expectation of a positive relationship. Similarly, the average dollar 
amount per round (RNDS$) is positively related to the likelihood of investing internationally. 
Together, these results suggest that VCs are not using the staging of financing as a monitoring 
mechanism. Moreover, they are decreasing the number of rounds and increasing the average 
dollar amount per round for their international investments. The above results do not allow for 
many report submissions about the progress from the portfolio companies to their VCs. A 
complete view of the monitoring picture is highlighted in the interpretation of column 2 of this 
table.  
The syndication proxy in this regression is the number of firms (NOFM). The fourth 
hypothesis suggests that VC funds prefer to syndicate their risky investments, as in this case. The 
empirical results show that the likelihood of less syndication is more pronounced in international 
investments. This is contrary to the testable hypothesis (H4A). This may be because VCs are 
more likely to collaborate with foreign counterparts than domestic ones. In this case, it is 
difficult to keep a healthy network with international counterparts, given the distance barriers. 
The size of funds proxied by the value of fund investments in US dollars (FDINV) is 
negatively related to the likelihood of investing internationally. Again, this is not consistent with 
the second hypothesis (H2A), which predicted a positive relation. This result highlights the fact 
that smaller VC funds are more likely to invest internationally than larger ones. This is because 
smaller VC funds aim to establish themselves very quickly, so they accept more risky 
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investments (such as international investments) to achieve higher returns. This justification is 
consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis.  
The last variable in column 1 is a control variable concerning the high-tech industry. IND 
is a dummy variable equal to “one” if the portfolio company produces a high-tech product. The 
relation appears negative and it is both statistically and economically significant. This shows that 
VCs are not likely to invest in high-tech international portfolio companies. One obvious reason is 
the difficulty of monitoring such companies compared to monitoring low-tech ones. 
Column 2 in Table 13 repeats the same LOGIT regression, but adds two more variables 
that proxy for the delegation hypothesis (H5A). This addition of the two variables increased the 
adjusted R-Square of the LOGIT from 0.06 in column 1 to 0.65 in column 2. The first variable 
EXEC% is the percentage of non-managing directors compared to the total number of directors 
in the portfolio company. This is a proxy for the involvement of the VC or his/her agent in the 
portfolio company. The higher the percentage of non-managing directors, the higher the 
involvement of the VC. This is based on the previous literature stating that VCs prefer to reserve 
one or more board seats. The other variable FOR% is the percentage of foreign (non-U.S.-based) 
VC funds to the total number of VC funds that invest in the portfolio company. This is a proxy of 
the level of dependency on foreign funds in monitoring the portfolio companies. Of course, the 
higher the percentage of foreign VC funds, the higher the involvement of foreign entities, and 
hence the delegation of a significant amount of monitoring to them.  
The results show that EXEC% is negatively related to INTL, while FOR% is positively 
related. Both are statistically and economically significant. This means that in an international 
investment setting (INTL), VCs do not reserve many seats among the directors, which means 
that only one or very few VC funds are monitoring the portfolio company. Moreover, more 
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foreign VC funds are involved when U.S.-based VC funds invest in the international portfolio 
company. The combination of these two variables suggests that U.S.-based VC funds prefer to 
collaborate with a foreign VC counterpart and that the U.S.-based VC funds are not likely to sit 
on the board; instead, they delegate their monitoring responsibilities to their foreign partner(s).  
In column 3, the LOGIT regression is similar to column 1, but replaces the syndication 
variable NOFM with NOFD. The main results are statistically and economically the same as 
column 1, except for the age of the portfolio company. The variable became marginally 
insignificant with a P-value of 0.1041. The new variable of the “number of funds” is significant 
and negative, which confirms the previous results.  
Column 4 repeats the LOGIT analysis, as in column 2, but again is in column 3 replacing 
NOFM with NOFD. The results of this regression are very similar to the results shown in column 
2. The variable number of funds is negative and significant. It became more economically 
significant than the results demonstrated in column 3. 
 Table 14 uses logistic analysis and researches the probability of the success of portfolio 
companies, taking into account VC monitoring techniques. The dependent variable SUCCESS is 
a dummy variable equal to “one” if the portfolio company has gone public, and “zero” otherwise. 
The independent variables used in this analysis are the same as those used in Table 13.  
The analysis in column 1 reveals that all of the independent variables are statistically 
significant, except for the variable RNDS. The sample in this LOGIT regression includes 
international portfolio companies only. The results show that the age of the VC firms (FMAGE) 
is positive and statistically significant. This is expected since the older the firm, the more 
experience it has, and the more value added to the portfolio company. This result is also 
consistent with the previous literature. In addition, the age of portfolio companies (COAGE) is
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Table 13 
 
Logistic Regression I 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -0.7342 0.0000  -2.0590 0.0000  -0.7607 0.0000  -2.1550 0.0000 
FMAGE 0.0113 0.0000  0.0226 0.0000  0.0117 0.0000  0.0235 0.0000 
COAGE 0.0029 0.0805  0.0079 0.0011  0.0027 0.1041  0.0076 0.0016 
RNDS -0.0904 0.0000  -0.0594 0.0007  -0.0716 0.0000  -0.0399 0.0271 
RNDS$ 0.0013 0.0004  0.0028 0.0000  0.0013 0.0003  0.0027 0.0000 
NOFM -0.0689 0.0000  -0.2020 0.0000       
NOFD       -0.0648 0.0000  -0.1624 0.0000 
FDINV -0.0018 0.0000  -0.0025 0.0003  -0.0018 0.0000  -0.0027 0.0003 
IND -0.2578 0.0000  -0.2709 0.0000  -0.2575 0.0000  -0.2841 0.0000 
EXEC%    -0.0089 0.0000     -0.0089 0.0000 
FOR%    0.0847 0.0000     0.0840 0.0000 
            
Nagelkerke R Square 0.06   0.65   0.06   0.65  
Chi-square 713.75 0.00  10391.32 0.00  744.41 0.00  10386.84 0.00 
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statistically and economically significant, and it is positively related to the probability of success 
(SUCCESS). This result is intuitive, since the more mature portfolio companies are more 
established in their markets than their younger counterparts. 
The number of rounds (RNDS) turned out to be insignificant in all four LOGIT 
regressions, while the average amount of dollars (RNDS$) was positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that the more generous the VC funds are toward the portfolio 
companies (on average, per round), the higher the likelihood of success.  
Syndication proxied by the two variables NOFM and NOFD is positively related to the 
probability of success (SUCCESS) of the portfolio companies. The fund size (FDINV) is 
negatively related to success and statistically significant. This shows that smaller VC funds are 
more successful than larger funds in investing internationally. This is consistent with the LOGIT 
regressions of Table 13, which showed that smaller VC funds are more likely to invest 
internationally than larger VC funds. The cause of this unpredictability needs more research, 
which is beyond the motivation of this manuscript. Confirming the results of Table 13, the status 
of the portfolio company as high-tech negatively relates to success. Moreover, it is statistically 
and economically significant. This contributes to the argument that high-tech companies are 
harder to control than companies in other industries with more tangible assets. 
In column 2, the two variables EXEC% and FOREIGN% were added to the LOGIT 
analysis. The R-Square increased from 0.08 to 0.13. Although it increased, it did not increase 
significantly, as the previous set of regressions in Table 13 had. Both variables are statistically 
significant. EXEC% is positively related to the likelihood of success, while FOREIGN% 
negatively relates to the likelihood of the success of the portfolio companies. These results have 
very serious implications for venture capitalists. The LOGIT analysis suggests that VC funds
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Table 14  
 
Logistic Regression II 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -2.4173 0.0000  -2.4340 0.0000  -2.3381 0.0000  -2.3813 0.0000 
FMAGE 0.0184 0.0000  0.0153 0.0003  0.0176 0.0000  0.0147 0.0005 
COAGE 0.0283 0.0000  0.0301 0.0000  0.0279 0.0000  0.0299 0.0000 
RNDS -0.0148 0.5988  -0.0273 0.3438  -0.0048 0.8704  -0.0228 0.4469 
RNDS$ 0.0024 0.0001  0.0020 0.0010  0.0025 0.0000  0.0021 0.0006 
NOFM 0.0501 0.0091  0.0604 0.0018       
NOFD       0.0235 0.1421  0.0356 0.0288 
FDINV -0.0212 0.0000  -0.0128 0.0061  -0.0213 0.0000  -0.0127 0.0068 
IND -0.2843 0.0041  -0.2456 0.0150  -0.2820 0.0044  -0.2397 0.0174 
EXEC%    0.0157 0.0000     0.0159 0.0000 
FOR%    -0.0102 0.0000     -0.0099 0.0000 
            
Nagelkerke R Square 0.08   0.13   0.08   0.12  
Chi-square 185.09 0.00  298.18 0.00  180.62 0.00  293.44 0.00 
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must increase their presence on the board of directors among the international portfolio 
companies and must decrease their reliance on a foreign VC counterpart. In other words, 
delegation (H5A) decreases the likelihood of the success of the international portfolio companies.  
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the LOGIT analysis of columns 1 and 2, respectively, but with 
the replacement of NOFM with the variable of NOFD. The results in the latter columns are very 
similar to columns 1 and 2 both statistically and economically.  
Robustness Checks 
A possible bias that might affect the results discussed above is the difference between 
countries. The fact that countries have different governance structures, rules and regulations may 
affect how VCs are investing internationally, especially in terms of delegation. To test for this 
bias, the above analysis is repeated with additional variables. The countries are divided into three 
different groups: GROUP1 includes countries from Latin America and Africa, GROUP2 
includes India, China and countries from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia and GROUP3 
includes Japan, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, and countries from Western Europe and other 
offshore investment hubs. The countries are categorized based on their openness to foreign 
investors and financial and legal development, with Group 1 being least open and Group 3 the 
most open. 
 Table 15 repeats the LOGIT regression I with two dummy variables: GROUP1 and 
GROUP2. The results show that all of the hypotheses hold as in Table 13, except for H3 and the 
control variable COAGE in some of the regressions. In the third hypothesis, RNDS is expected 
to be significant and positive. However, it turned out to be insignificant in the two of the four 
logistic regressions, when the variables that test for the delegation hypothesis are present. In 
other words, when there is delegation to a foreign counterpart, funding rounds are no longer used 
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Table 15 
 
Robustness Checks for Logistic Regression I 
 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
 Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -1.0593 0.0000  -2.5680 0.0000  -1.0747 0.0000  -2.6518 0.0000 
FMAGE 0.0113 0.0000  0.0233 0.0000  0.0115 0.0000  0.0240 0.0000 
COAGE 0.0000 0.9816  0.0050 0.0734  -0.0002 0.9015  0.0047 0.0884 
RNDS -0.0573 0.0000  -0.0305 0.1047  -0.0386 0.0013  -0.0084 0.6654 
RNDS$ 0.0012 0.0011  0.0027 0.0000  0.0013 0.0008  0.0027 0.0000 
NOFM -0.0507 0.0000  -0.1696 0.0000       
NOFD       -0.0515 0.0000  -0.1413 0.0000 
FDINV -0.0022 0.0000  -0.0022 0.0005  -0.0022 0.0000  -0.0023 0.0005 
IND -0.3541 0.0000  -0.3332 0.0000  -0.3512 0.0000  -0.3415 0.0000 
EXEC%    -0.0090 0.0000     -0.0090 0.0000 
FOR%    0.0870 0.0000     0.0866 0.0000 
GROUP1 22.5336 0.9958  23.5709 0.9951  22.5256 0.9958  23.5670 0.9951 
GROUP2 22.5056 0.9870   22.2428 0.9844   22.5011 0.9871  22.2684 0.9844 
            
Nagelkerke R Square 0.2495   0.7281   0.2513   0.7285  
Chi-square 3313.16 0.0000   12076.18 0.0000   3339.14 0.0000  12086.01 0.0000 
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as a monitoring technique. This may be because of the inability of U.S.-based VCs to be 
involved in setting the times of reporting and funding, since the foreign counterpart has almost a 
complete control over the investee. This could happen in cultures that believe that foreigners (in 
this case, U.S. VCs) should not give orders to locals. On the other hand, when RNDS is 
statistically significant it shows a negative relation with INTL, which is the same result as in 
Table 13.  
 In addition, COAGE became insignificant in two regressions where the delegation 
hypothesis is not introduced. If there is no delegation and the U.S.-based VC acts individually, 
the portfolio company’s age may not be important. This may happen in situations in which the 
investee has more certain and larger returns; therefore, U.S.-based VCs do not need a foreign VC 
counterpart.  
 Table 16 repeats the LOGIT regression II as in Table 14, with the two dummy variables 
GROUP1 and GROUP2. The results introduced are statistically very similar to the original tests, 
and they have the same signs. The GROUP2 (India, China, and countries from Eastern Europe 
and Southeast Asia) dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level in all regressions, 
suggesting that there is a positive likelihood of success in those countries compared to GROUP1 
(countries from Latin America and Africa), which is insignificant. This result is intuitive, since 
GROUP2 is characterized by economic stability and openness to foreign investment compared to 
GROUP1, and VCs are expected to enjoy more success probabilities in open/stable economies 
than in strict ones. 
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Table 16  
 
Robustness Checks for Logistic Regression II 
 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
 Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value   Coefficient P-Value 
CONSTANT -2.8790 0.0000  -2.9565 0.0000  -2.7672 0.0000  -2.8799 0.0000 
FMAGE 0.0196 0.0000  0.0168 0.0001  0.0186 0.0000  0.0160 0.0002 
COAGE 0.0285 0.0000  0.0307 0.0000  0.0281 0.0000  0.0304 0.0000 
RNDS 0.0170 0.5450  0.0014 0.9598  0.0249 0.3912  0.0049 0.8687 
RNDS$ 0.0024 0.0001  0.0021 0.0009  0.0025 0.0000  0.0022 0.0005 
NOFM 0.0748 0.0001  0.0800 0.0000       
NOFD       0.0408 0.0108  0.0490 0.0029 
FDINV -0.0211 0.0000  -0.0121 0.0111  -0.0210 0.0000  -0.0118 0.0131 
IND -0.3624 0.0003  -0.3081 0.0027  -0.3562 0.0004  -0.2996 0.0035 
EXEC%    0.0170 0.0000     0.0172 0.0000 
FOR%    -0.0094 0.0000     -0.0090 0.0000 
GROUP1 0.2022 0.5514  -0.1275 0.7139  0.1838 0.5871  -0.1365 0.6938 
GROUP2 1.1049 0.0000  1.1465 0.0000   1.0794 0.0000  1.1276 0.0000 
            
Nagelkerke R Square 0.1193   0.1662   0.1161   0.1633  
Chi-square 283.84 0.0000  400.57 0.0000   275.79 0.0000  393.24 0.0000 
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Conclusions 
Venture capitalists have constantly been looking for new deals, which has motivated 
them to invest internationally. This study has investigated international investments by U.S.-
based venture capital firms.  
Previous literature highlights the importance of VCs’ geographic proximity to their 
portfolio companies. However, international investment has not been covered by existing 
research. Therefore, this essay fills a gap in the literature by uncovering the different monitoring 
techniques and characteristics of U.S.-based VCs in terms of their international portfolio 
companies and by evaluating the factors affecting the success rates of these international 
portfolio companies.  
More experienced VCs are more likely to invest in international investments. Moreover, 
more established and non-high-tech international portfolio companies are preferred by VCs. In 
addition, smaller VC funds are more likely to invest internationally. This result is not consistent 
with the predictable hypothesis; however, it can be seen as a new application for the 
grandstanding hypothesis.  
VCs do not tighten their monitoring techniques for their international portfolio 
companies. On the contrary, VCs require a smaller number of rounds and, on average, they 
provide more funding per round to their international investments. This result can be explained 
by the delegation hypothesis. In this case, U.S.-based VCs delegate monitoring to one or more 
VC counterpart(s). This foreign VC is assumed to be familiar with the environment of the 
portfolio company, sits as a non-managing director and helps the portfolio company management 
when they encounter difficulties. Contrary to what was predicted about syndication, the number 
of syndicates (both firms and funds) is likely to decrease in the case of international investments. 
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The second part of the paper uses the sub-sample of the international portfolio companies 
to determine the factors that affect the likelihood of success. The empirical analysis suggests that 
there is a positive likelihood of success when the VC firm is more experienced and the portfolio 
company is older and non-high-tech. Moreover, the non-tightening of monitoring techniques, as 
shown by the smaller number of rounds and more average funding per round, is positively 
related to the likelihood of success. VCs already use all of the above factors. On the other hand, 
VCs do not currently use the following two results that are explained by the syndication and the 
delegation hypotheses. First, increasing the number of syndicates (both VC firms and VC funds) 
positively relates to the likelihood of success, which is opposite to the strategy they are currently 
adopting. Also, VCs must decrease their dependency on delegation and increase their actual 
presence because the delegation hypothesis negatively relates to the likelihood of success.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
 
The venture capital industry is expected to grow both domestically and internationally 
because of its significant correlation with innovation. This dissertation examines the methods of 
the participants in this industry and, building on the previous literature, details key findings about 
the effects of a variety of factors on the health of both domestically and internationally controlled 
portfolio companies.  
This study has generated a number of key findings about the effects of a variety of factors 
on the health of portfolio companies, and specifically examines the role of venture capitalists in 
troubled portfolio companies post-IPO. The results of various tests have proven that the number 
of funding rounds (a proxy for monitoring techniques) is a significant factor in differentiating 
between healthy and troubled companies. Specifically, it is shown that the more monitoring and 
attention given to portfolio companies by their VCs, the higher the probability of the companies 
being healthy. This finding is robust even after considering the ability/propensity of VCs to share 
in the management of the portfolio company, and even after using a stricter definition of success 
for the matching sample of healthy portfolio companies.Test results also show that VC 
experience and reputation, incentives provided by VCs, industry and sales volume are important 
factors in determining the duration of the life of VC-backed troubled companies. 
This study has also proven that financial leverage is not a significant factor in predicting 
the bankruptcy of VC-backed, public, troubled portfolio companies. This result is inconsistent 
with general bankruptcy literature; however, it is consistent with the hypothetical predictions in 
the paper. Also, consistent monitoring and increased VC involvement can differentiate a healthy 
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VC-backed company from a troubled VC-backed company – which is consistent with the 
previous literature concerning the benefits of venture capitalists. Finally, the experience, 
reputation and investment incentives of VCs are all significant factors in extending the life of a 
troubled VC-backed company, but insignificant in differentiating a healthy company from a 
troubled one. 
This chapter also draws new conclusions about the role of U.S.-based VCs in their 
international investments. This chapter reveals how VCs interact with their companies when the 
distance is more than just a few miles. In the case of international investments, VCs have to 
travel thousands of miles to monitor and be closely involved with their companies. This research 
demonstrates that U.S.-based VCs tend to syndicate with fewer firms and funds and also to 
include a foreign counterpart(s). VCs who invest internationally are likely to be more 
experienced than those who invest domestically, and they tend to invest in older portfolio 
companies and delegate the monitoring and involvement duties to foreign counterparts. This 
chapter proves that VCs should syndicate their international investments with a larger number of 
VC firms and funds. Also, they should reserve more board seats than they do now and use fewer 
foreign counterparts. 
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Appendix I: Summary of the Predictable Hypotheses for Chapter 3 
 
 
Set 1: (Logit)  
εββββββββα +++++++++= ++−++ SALESINDMBDEAGERECENTRNDSPERSuccess Insig 87654
/
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Set 2: (OLS)  
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βββββββα
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Where; 
- SUCCESS is a dummy variable equals to one if the portfolio company did not file for 
bankruptcy and zero otherwise. 
- DURATION is the number of years of life of bankrupt portfolio companies. It is 
calculated as the year of delisting minus the year of IPO. 
- PER is the percentage of the fund that is invested in the portfolio company. One of the 
problems of this ratio is that each portfolio company is funded by a variety of VC funds. 
Some companies are funded by 30 funds. In addition, this variable is new to venture 
capital literature. Several measurements were used as a proxy in order to achieve the 
most accurate result: (a) PCAV of fund j, equals total estimated amount of fund j’s 
investment in company i divided by fund j’s average company investment. In order to get 
around the problem of consolidating the effect of many funds into one ratio, the mean and 
median were calculated. PCAVMN equals the mean of the ratio of PCAV that relates to 
company i, which had funds j through k. Similarly, PCAVMD equals the median of the 
ratio PCAV that relates to company i, which had funds j through k. (b) PCMX of fund j, 
equals total estimated amount of fund j’s investment in company i divided by funds j’s 
maximum company investment. PCMXMN equals the mean of the ratio of PCMX that 
relates to company i, which had funds j through k and, PCMXMD equals the median of 
the ratio PCMX that relates to company i, which had funds j through k.  
- RNDS is the average number of rounds that the venture capitalists invested in the 
portfolio company.  
- RECENT refers to the number of recent successes or failures of venture capital fund j 
within the last 2 years (excluding the year of delisting). The number of recent success is 
measured by the number of IPOS the VC was a part of. Again, many funds invest in one 
company, while “Recent” is a ratio that is specific for each fund. To overcome this 
problem, the same technique is used here. RECMN is the mean of “Recent” of fund j 
through k that invest in company i, and RECMD is the median of “Recent” of fund j 
through k that invest in company i. 
- AGE refers to the average age of the venture capital firms that invest in company i. This 
is used as a proxy for the level of experience of VCs. Age is calculated as the number of 
years between the firms’ inceptions until the delisted year of the portfolio company. 
- DE is the portfolio company’s ratio of debt to equity. 
- MB is the portfolio company’s ratio of market-to-book. 
- IND is a dummy variable equals to one if the company is a hi-tech and zero otherwise. 
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- SALE is the portfolio company’s sales. 
-    LNRNDS is Ln of the RNDS variable. 
- LNRECENT is Ln of the RECENT variable. LNRECMN and LNRECMD variables 
follow the same application. 
- LNAGE is ln of the AGE variable. 
- LNSALES is the ln of Sales variable. 
-    ε  is the random error term. 
 
 
Set 1  
 
Success or Fail Determinants and Full Effect of Venture Capitalists 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 (Dependent Variable is 
SUCCESS) 
Predictable Sign 
Sources of Variables Hypothesis 
Reference 
PER + VentureXpert H1 
RNDS + VentureXpert H5 
RECENT -/+ VentureXpert H2 
AGE + VentureXpert H3 
DE Insignificant COMPUSTAT H4 
MB Unknown COMPUSTAT Control Variable 
SALES + COMPUSTAT Control Variable 
EXEC% Unknown VentureXpert Control Variable 
IND Unknown VentureXpert Control Variable 
 
 
Set 2 
 
Life in Years for Bankrupt Portfolio Companies and Partial Effect of Venture Capitalists. 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 (Dependent 
Variable is 
DURATION) 
Predictable Sign 
Sources of Variables Hypothesis 
Reference 
PER + VentureXpert H1S 
LNRNDS Insignificant VentureXpert H5S 
LNRECENT -/+ VentureXpert H2S 
LNAGE + VentureXpert H3S 
DE Insignificant COMPUSTAT H4S 
MB Unknown COMPUSTAT Control Variable 
LNSALES + COMPUSTAT Control Variable 
IND Unknown VentureXpert Control Variable 
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Appendix II: Summary of the Predictable Hypotheses for Chapter 4 
 
 
Set 1: LOGIT Analysis I 
εβββ
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Set 2: LOGIT Analysis II (Best Practices) 
εββββ
βββββα
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Where; 
- INTL is a dummy variable equals to one if the portfolio company is an international 
portfolio company funded by a U.S. fund, and zero otherwise. 
- SUCCESS is a dummy variable equals to one if the company went public and zero 
otherwise. 
- FMAGE is the age of the venture capital firm, measured in years. This is a proxy for the 
experience of the VC. 
- COAGE is the age of the portfolio company, measured in years. This is a proxy for the 
establishment/experience of the portfolio company. 
- RNDS refers to the number of rounds the VC used to fund that portfolio company. 
- RNDS$ is the average dollar amount in millions per round. 
- FDINV is the average size of fund’s investment in millions that is invested in all portfolio 
company. This is a proxy for the fund size.  
- IND is a dummy variable equals to one if the VC is specialized in the hi-tech industry 
and zero otherwise. 
- EXEC% is the percentage of the non-managing members of the board of directors to the 
total number to the board of directors. 
- FOR% is the percentage of foreign VC funds to the total number of VC funds that 
invested in the portfolio company. 
- ε  is the random error term. 
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Set 1 
 
LOGIT Analysis I 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 (Dependent 
Variable is INTL) 
Predictable sign  
 
 
Sources of Variables 
 
 
Hypothesis Reference 
FMAGE + VentureXpert H1 
FDINV + VentureXpert H2 
RNDS + VentureXpert H3 
RNDS$ - VentureXpert H3 
SYND + VentureXpert H4 
EXEC% - VentureXpert H5 
FOR% + VentureXpert H5 
IND Unknown VentureXpert Control Variable 
COAGE Unknown VentureXpert Control Variable 
 
 
 
  
 
81
Vita 
 
 
Khaled Abdou was born in Cairo in 1975. After he graduated from high school, he 
attended Helwan University in Cairo to study Business Administration and Commerce, 
specializing in accounting. Upon graduation, he worked as a financial analyst for El Iman 
Company for Brokerage and Dealings in Securities, Cairo. Khaled then passed the Uniform CPA 
Examination and joined Misr International Bank. He then joined Deloitte to work as a senior 
auditor and financial consultant. 
In 2001, Khaled moved to the United States and gained his Master of Business 
Administration at Eastern Illinois University in 2001. He then worked as an independent 
financial and accounting consultant and a Chief Financial Officer in Champaign/Urbana, IL. He 
joined the Ph.D. program at the University of New Orleans in 2002 to enhance his Financial 
Economics knowledge. 
